Networks of Terror, Failed States and Failing Policies After September 11.

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A very common response to the events of September 11, 2001, beyond the shock and the horror, was to declare that everything is different and that the world would never be the same again. In many important ways, that was true. There is no doubt that the events altered the American and World’s perception of George Bush and challenged the approach to international relations and problems that had characterized the first nine months of the administration. Now that a year has passed it is useful to see how much is indeed different in terms of the administrations approach to foreign policy in general and more specifically to failed states and the problem of terrorism that it has been forced to confront.

This first year of the George W. Bush presidency witnessed pronounced differences in both declaratory and actual United States foreign policy. Early on the new President and his foreign policy team indicated their intention to focus on the issues surrounding nuclear weapons and missile shields and their impact on relations with Russia, China, and Europe. Nuclear and military strategy and a clear intention to distance themselves from the previous administration’s declaratory multilateralism dominated the administration’s initial foreign policy agenda. In these first nine months, the Bush administration caused public worry within the councils of its closest allies in Europe and Asia and concern around the world by its intention to abandon treaties, decline participation in multilateral discussions, thwart the development of new accords or follow through on previous U.S. commitments. They also made clear their intention to adopt a more “hands- off” attitude to potential problems and crises in the Middle East, Africa, and the Balkans. The President and his foreign policy team through their abandonment of Kyoto, announced intention to abrogate the ABM treaty, abandonment of talks with North Korea and their disdain for all things multilateral gained a reputation amongst friends and foes as arrogant unilateralists.

Before September 11, 2001 the problem of failed states was viewed at best as peripheral by the Bush administration and more often as a means of distancing itself from the liberal do-gooders of the Clinton Administration. Absent from the list of Administration foreign policy priorities outlined prior to taking office by current National Security Adviser Rice (Rice 2000) was the problem of failed states. As R. Stohl and I argued last year,

“… this omission is quite conscious. Mr. Bush and his foreign policy team have focused on what they characterized as the misuse of the military and other strategic resources in the Clinton administration’s concern with nation-building, humanitarian intervention and other aspects of what Michael Mandelbaum (1996) labeled “Foreign Policy as Social Work.” Throughout the past year they have argued that these concerns damaged U.S. military readiness because they diverted resources from core national security or national interest concerns.

Rice’s argument appeared just months after The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century April, 2000 report outlined six key national security objectives for the first quarter of the 21st Century. The sixth key national security
objective was to "help the international community tame the disintegrative forces spawned by an era of change." Analyzing the impact of globalization and the emerging security paradigms that resulted from the end of the Cold War, the Commission identified failed and weak states as specific challenges the United States would face with increasing regularity in the next twenty-five years. However, the Commission did not recommend that the United States address the problem of failed states in general. Rather, they recommended attention to, in the words of Chase et al (1996), only “pivotal states.”

The Commission's recommendation that the United States establish priorities for aiding weak and failing states translated into selective rankings of nations that should be assisted. The Commission pointed to four in particular – Mexico, Colombia, Russia, and Saudi Arabia – whose stability is of "major importance to U.S. interests."

Prior to September 11, few among The Commission, Condoleeza Rice and the vast majority of the broadly defined American Foreign Policy Establishment argued that the problem of failed states was what Ashton Carter and William Perry (1999) had labeled an A-List security problem. Failed States were for most “security” experts a problem of humanitarian concern. And while some did identify catastrophic terrorism as a potential problem, it was catastrophic terrorism that was caused by the use of weapons of mass destruction, that is, chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, perhaps aided by the forces of a “Rogue State,” that they worried about, as Rice (2000:46-47) made clear by placing it in her list of priorities.

“• to deal decisively with the threat of rogue regimes and hostile powers, which is increasingly taking the forms of the potential for terrorism and the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).”

However, it was as state sponsors of terrorism and more importantly the link to weapons of mass destruction that were at issue.

today’s most urgent threat stems not from thousands of ballistic missiles in the Soviet hands, but from a small number of missiles in the hands of these states, states for whom terror and blackmail are a way of life. They seek weapons of mass destruction to intimidate their neighbors, and to keep the United States and other responsible nations from helping allies and friends in strategic parts of the world.

Remarks by President Bush to Students and Faculty at the National Defense University, Washington, D.C. May 1, 2001

Likewise, just prior to the 9/11 attacks, Attorney General Ashcroft had demonstrated his disinterest in the problem of terrorism.

On September 10 last year, the last day of what is now seen as a bygone age of innocence, Mr. Ashcroft sent a request for budget increases to the White House. It covered 68 programmes, none of them related to counter-terrorism. He also sent a memorandum to his heads of departments, stating his seven priorities. Counter-terrorism was not on the list. He turned down an FBI request for hundreds more agents to be assigned to tracking terrorist threats (Borger, 2002.)
Failed States, never a priority for the Bush administration, was thus also joined by terrorism as outside the scope of foreign or domestic priorities.

The attacks on 9/11 dramatically settled what the failed states debate amongst policymakers and scholars had not. Al Qaeda’s relationship with the Taliban in Afghanistan revealed that it is not simply the “pivotal states” in regions outside the North American and European continents with which the United States as both the world’s leading military power (whether one celebrates or laments its primacy) and most globalized nation in terms of economic, communication, and cultural networks need be concerned. What the attack demonstrated to a reluctant Washington establishment was that weak states provide opportunities for safe haven, for establishing training centers and for massing large numbers of operatives. Al Qaeda appears to have used four “failed states,” Somalia, Yemen and the Sudan as well as Afghanistan for much of its training and as safe haven and transit. Those who could not be swayed by the “humanitarian” arguments as to the importance of failed states were now convinced of their strategic importance. Indeed, Walt (2002:62) now argues that

The attacks on September 11 demonstrate that failed states are more than a humanitarian tragedy; they can also be a major national security problem. The Taliban government and the al-Qaeda movement arose from the protracted civil conflict within Afghanistan, and bin Laden has used failed states for refuge since the mid-1990s. Indeed, if Afghanistan had been governed by a more capable and moderate regime over the past decade, bin Laden would not have found sanctuary there, and the attacks on the United States might never have occurred.

Going further, Record sees “the emergence of weak and failed states as the primary threat to US security… (Record, 2202:5).”

Thus, since September 11, 2001, failed states and failing states as well as terrorism have received a great deal of attention. The administration first declared and then initiated a “war on terror” and in so doing engaged in building a coalition of forces and support as well as seeking international collaboration for providing aid to Afghanistan after the conclusion of military hostilities. But as we approach the anniversary of the attacks, much of the behaviors, the policies and the rhetoric of the Bush administration have returned to that pre 9/11 world. Unilateralism, exceptionalism and disinterest in the strategic interests and priorities of other states have trumped the rhetoric of the fall of 2001.

In this paper, I will review evaluate the administration’s approach to the “War on Terror,” examine its connections to the problem of failed states and argue that the policies adopted are likely to fail in both the short and long run.

The War on Terror, Terror Networks and Failed States

“This group and its leader — a person named Osama bin Laden — are linked to many other organizations in different countries, including the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. There are thousands of these terrorists in more than 60 countries. They are recruited from their own nations and neighborhoods and brought to camps in places like Afghanistan, where they are trained in the tactics of terror. They are
sent back to their homes or sent to hide in countries around the world to plot evil and destruction.

“Our war on terror begins with al-Qaida, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated…”

“How will we fight and win this war? We will direct every resource at our command—every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war—to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network.”

--George W. Bush Address to Joint Session of Congress September 20, 2001

From the White House Web Page

Mission
The military phase of the War Against Terrorism began October 7, 2001 under the name "Operation Enduring Freedom." Since then, coalition forces have liberated the Afghan people from the repressive and violent Taliban regime. As President Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld have said, this is a different kind of war against a different kind of enemy. The enemy is not a nation -- the enemy is terrorist networks that threaten the way of life of all peaceful people.

War
Frequently Asked Questions

“How Long Will the Effort Take?
There is no silver bullet, no single event or action that is going to suddenly make the threat of terrorism disappear. This broad-based and sustained effort will continue until terrorism is rooted out. The situation is similar to the Cold War, when continuous pressure from many nations caused communism to collapse from within. We will press the fight as long as it takes. We will prevail.”

In the year since President Bush announced the war against the global terror network and terrorism, in addition to the term “war” itself, the terms “terror(ism),” “network(s),” and “network(s) of terror(ism)” have become part of the everyday vocabulary of the media, public officials and the public. At first glance it would appear that the now commonplace usage of the terms provides both a useful shared meaning of the terms and that the shared meanings provide useful insights into the problem of understanding terrorism. I will argue (1) that describing the U.S. response as war was a significant mistake that undermines the effort to confront terrorism and to reduce its impact, (2) that the uses of both the terms terror and network have been rather inconsistent, (3) that the network metaphor implies both more and less for our understanding of the problem of terrorism than is assumed by its easy adoption by commentators, (4) that there are not only different types of networks but different types of terrorist networks and networks of terror and that it is important to distinguish among them if the network approach will be useful, and (5) that it is paramount that we remember that how we “react” to the terror and the network(s) are the most important aspect to responding to the threat of terrorism.
A. The “War” on Terror

The administration, in its initial stages of preparing for the “war” on terrorism, sought to put together broad diplomatic backing for its efforts. The members of NATO and the Rio Pact invoked these treaties’ mutual defense clauses for the first time. Sixteen of 19 NATO members are engaged in the Afghan theater. The UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1373 requiring all UN members to freeze terrorist financing, improve border security, clamp down on the recruitment of terrorists, share information, and deny terrorists any support or safe haven.

The administration then moved to “the war phase.” It is clear that the administration chose to use the war metaphor to demonstrate the full resolve of the United States to respond to the attacks. However, from the moment of his remarks to journalists on the White House lawn in the week after the attacks when Mr. Bush said: "This crusade, this war on terrorism, is going to take a while." to the initial naming of the military response as operation infinite justice (which gave way to Operation Enduring Freedom when it was made clear to the White House that the term gave offense to Muslim sensibilities), to the failure of the administration to actually obtain a congressional declaration of war, the war metaphor has undermined the ability of the United States to manage the problem of terrorism.

Could it have been avoided? Certainly, rather than what President George W. Bush so unfortunately termed "a crusade against evil" -- that is, a military campaign conducted by an alliance dominated by the United States -- many people would have preferred a police operation conducted under the auspices of the United Nations on behalf of the international community as a whole, against a criminal conspiracy whose members should be hunted down and brought before an international court, where they would receive a fair trial and, if found guilty, be awarded an appropriate sentence (Howard, 2002).

Once the administration declared war, it committed the errors of not clearly defining the enemy, the scope of operations, the theater of war, or even to provide the metrics by which the military and public could judge whether or not it had won or even was winning.

Seventeen years later than expected, 1984 has arrived. In his address to Congress Thursday, George Bush effectively declared permanent war -- war without temporal or geographic limits; war without clear goals; war against a vaguely defined and constantly shifting enemy. Today it's Al-Qaida; tomorrow it may be Afghanistan; next year, it could be Iraq or Cuba or Chechnya.

No one who was forced to read 1984 in high school could fail to hear a faint bell tinkling. In George Orwell's dreary classic, the totalitarian state of Oceania is perpetually at war with either Eurasia or Eastasia. Although the enemy changes periodically, the war is permanent; its true purpose is to control dissent and sustain dictatorship by nurturing popular fear and hatred.

The permanent war undergirds every aspect of Big Brother's authoritarian program, excusing censorship, propaganda, secret police, and privation. In other words, it's terribly convenient (Levitch, 2001).
While in the weeks after the attacks, the American public was overwhelmingly “behind” the President and the administration, the administration’s approach was destined not simply for satire but more importantly failure after its initial overwhelming demonstration of military power and destruction.

Almost a year after the start of the military campaign, the administration is not able to demonstrate that we are closer to victory in the war than when it began. In large part this is because the administration was not mindful of the lessons of responding to terrorism that have been learned over the past three decades. Treating the operation as a war, allowed the United States to demonstrate once again that it was able to bring to bear overwhelming force, high tech airpower and a capacity to destroy that is second to none. However, the power to destroy is not equivalent to countering the threat, or the fear of the threat of future terrorism. While the “war” in Afghanistan successfully eliminated the Taliban government and destroyed the obvious safe haven that Afghanistan provided for Bin Laden and Al Qaeda, it is difficult to judge the war a success as thus far it has not accomplished its primary purpose, the destruction of the global terror network as evidenced by the continuing fear of attack as we approach the anniversary of September 11.

B. Global Terror Network?

One explanation for the failure to demonstrate success is that despite numerous statements by the Bush administration, they have never clearly and fully identified what they actually mean by a network of terror and whom (Beyond Osama Bin Laden and the leaders of Al Qaeda) actually need to be brought to justice for the “war” to be won. Their failure stems from either unwillingness or an inability to clearly specify what they actually mean and some implications of the global network.

Let us begin by looking at the terms themselves.

It is necessary to be quite specific in distinguishing terrorism from other forms of political violence. I begin by stating and explaining the definition of terrorism which I believe we should employ. It is consistent with the elements of most discussions of terrorism by scholars and government officials but it is distinct from many such definitions by omitting from the definition any reference to the political actors and focuses exclusively on the act itself.

The purposeful act or the threat of the act of violence to create fear and/or compliant behavior in a victim and/or audience of the act or threat.

The key words are purposeful, violence, fear, victim and audience. It is crucial to understand that we must distinguish the victims of the violent act from the targets (the audience of that violence). Terrorists are primarily interested in the audience, not the victims. The process of political terrorism may be characterized (Walter, 1969) as consisting of three component parts: the act or
threat of violence, the emotional reaction to the act or threat and the social effects resultant from the acts and reaction. An important key to the understanding of terrorism is to recognize that although each of the component parts of the process is important, the emotional impact of the terrorist act and the social effects are more important than the particular action itself. In other words, the targets of the terror (the audience) are far more important for the process than are the victims of the immediate act. Thus political terrorism should be seen as a process of political communication process and not simply a destructive or “simple” act of violence (For greater depth on these points see Stohl, 1988 chapters one and seven).

Since the President’s “declaration of war” on the 20th of September, the United States has been engaged in a war on terror whose avowed aim is the destruction of the “global network of terror.” The approach is rhetorical rather than social science analytical and this has important implications for not only our understanding of the “global network of terror” but for the counter terrorism policies and military actions that the administration’s approach has created.

In its simplest form, a network refers to the web of social relations that connect individuals, groups, and organizations. In the context of our discussion of “networks of terror” the referent is normally to how various terrorist groups, and other organizations and states are connected and how they are organized and operate.

The insight of Lauman, Marsden and Prensky nearly twenty years ago with respect to the then state of the art in network analysis is particularly germane with respect to the identification of networks of terror. They wrote:

“In view of the potential consequences of an incorrect specification of system boundaries in network analysis, it is somewhat surprising that the published literature reporting studies of social networks shows little concern for the problem of specifying the inclusion rules in defining the membership of actors in particular networks and in identifying the types of social relationships to be analyzed (Lauman, Marsden and Prensky, 1983:19).”

Further, as C. Stohl (1995) reminds us, “Depending upon how we define link, the membership and configuration of networks change and our understanding of organizing processes is somewhat altered (35)...Not all links are equal (39).”

Trying to piece together the nature of any clandestine network is always difficult. Information with respect to clandestine groups is, or at least should be, always employed with great circumspection. Much of the information is based on rumor, leaks from intelligence agencies, competitive political organizations and police and other state actors who are supplying the information for various political, law enforcement and bureaucratic purposes. It is therefore incumbent upon the analyst to specify how link, membership and the network are being used in the analysis. To illustrate I would first turn to a previous period of concern with respect to networks of terror.

In 1977 Ovid Demaris, a freelance reporter, published Brothers in Blood: the International Terrorist Network in which he argued that terrorist groups had established worldwide liaisons. Through such a network of liaisons, terrorists could obtain whatever was necessary for their operations including the possibility
If nuclear weaponry. For Demaris, the links were “associational” and “informal.” In 1979, Robert Kupperman and Darrell Trent argued in *Terrorism: Threat, Reality, Response* (22) that, “There is evidence of increasing cooperation among national and international terrorist organizations in the form of common financial and technical support... for example Palestinian terrorist camps in Lebanon, Syria, Libya (and until 1970, Jordan) have trained revolutionaries from Western Europe, Africa, Latin America, Asia and North America in terrorist techniques...” For Kupperman and Trent, the links, while still “associational” and “informal” in terms of the terrorist groups which interacted and cooperated had a common source of financial and technical support, the Soviet Union. The most widely cited “expose” of the “terror network” was Claire Sterling’s *The Terror Network* published in 1981. Ms. Sterling argued that there existed an international network of terrorists within whose center one finds a Palestinian connection and a Russian patron, with, quite often, a Cuban cutout providing the shield for direct Russian participation. She argued that the Soviet Union had placed a loaded gun of the world table and benefited each time someone picked it up and used it. Secretary of State Alexander Haig and the Reagan administration went further and suggested that the Russians were behind it all. The administration was unable to convince its own intelligence agencies (or those of its allies) to support its view of the Soviet role and was not able to provide public evidence for the existence of such an actual network (Taubman, 1981:10; Pear, 1981:8; Miller, 1981:4). In one of the more celebrated instances of “blowback,” William Casey, Director of the CIA, confronted his analysts when they refused to confirm that the Soviets were behind it all. “Read Claire Sterling's book and forget this mush. I paid $13.95 for this and it told me more than you bastards whom I pay $50,000 a year.(Woodward,1987:125-127)” Woodward reports that Sterling had actually been leaked dubious material as part of a CIA propaganda scheme. Thus, while there is no doubt that there was Soviet support for the aims of many of the groups that were under suspicion, and that many members of those groups had passed through either the Soviet Union or one of its client states, there was also no clear network chart that distinguished the types of clear links, membership and type of network.

Moving beyond the notion of “fishing in troubled waters” to a network of terrorism is more than an academic exercise. It is crucial to understanding how to respond to the problem. It is necessary to be able to distinguish between groups which have access to arms, finance, training, safe haven and other technical support provided by various states in pursuit of foreign policy objectives. Distinguishing between support and control, and distinguishing between support and acquiescence in terms of hard information has proven to be quite difficult.

As we have learned from the more than decade long debate on the “Soviet Network of Terror” we need to distinguish truly networked individuals and organizations (with leaders, goals and an actual organization and all that implies) from individuals, groups and organizations that share common ideological leanings, goals and methods but do not act in coordination, even if, at times, their actions appear to be supportive, coordinated and coherent. Our information on these groups comes from scattered news reports and interviews, public
statements from government officials, captured documents and existing scholarly analyses. We also need to distinguish an organization of terrorists from a network of independent organizations acting in coalition under certain circumstances and simply like minded organizations. Is Al Qaeda a loose confederation of organizations, a hierarchical organization with a cell structure, or a horizontal modern “networked organization?” Is the organization composed of thousands of members, hundreds of cells and located in 60 or more countries or is it a much smaller organization which coalesces with other existing organizations when it needs to move people, money or material around the world. Further, while we know that

“The theoretical mechanisms that generate most network organizations are exchange and dependency relations. Rather than being organized around market or hierarchical principles, network organizations are created out of complex webs of exchange and dependency relations among multiple organizations (Monge and Contractor, 2001:463).”

These mechanisms apply quite clearly to the case of cooperative behaviors among clandestine political organizations, state agents, criminals, legitimate corporations, banks, and various publics. However, it does not mean that the “organizational network” that exists as a result is either a unitary entity or a corporate actor like IBM

“To imply something too organized, too hierarchical, misses the reality,” said Brian Jenkins, a terrorism expert at the Rand Corp. "We're obliged to talk about universes of like-minded fanatics -- nothing that appears like a wiring diagram Western bureaucrats are familiar with (Lynch and Loeb, 1999: A01)."

Making the identification more difficult, clandestine networks generally have adopted either a chain structure. i.e., a line of separated contacts or cells in which it is necessary to go through the chain to get from one end to the other, or hub structure, i.e. where a set of cells (or chains) are tied to a central node and must go through the central node to get to anywhere else in the organization (see Arquilla, Ronfeld and Zanini, 1999:48-52) to protect the integrity of the network and particularly the leader or core group. In additional there are examples of hob networks which consist of independent chains connected to the hub. Classic underground smuggling rings (of people or things) adopt chain “networks,” and classic intelligence operations use variants of hub networks.

There is great difference from both practical and theoretical perspectives if we are then identifying a networked organization (for example s highly structured Al Qaeda with Bin Laden as its leader and either a chain or hub structure with control generated from the top) or a loose alliance of like minded organizations, that cooperate under specific circumstances on limited grounds and for limited periods, some of which organizations may also be “networked in terms of their internal organization. While both forms are treated as networks in both the scholarly and popular literature their structures have very different implications for trying to dismantle them.
Miles and Snow have argued that independent organizations may become a dynamic network of interdependent organizations when organized by a broker (Miles and Snow 1986, cited by Mcphee and Poole, p.517). It is possible that Bin Laden and Al Qaeda were able to achieve this. Gunaratna, referring to Al Qaeda argues

It is neither a single group or a coalition of groups: it comprised a core base or bases in Afghanistan, satellite terrorist cells worldwide, a conglomerate of Islamist political parties, and other largely independent terrorist groups that it draws on for offensive actions and other responsibilities. Leaders of all the above are co-opted as and when necessary to serve as an integral part of Al Qaeda’s high command, which is run via a vertical leadership structure that provides strategic direction and tactical support to its horizontal network of compartmentalized cells and associate organizations (Gunaratna, 2002, 54).

However it is also possible that the anti – U.S., anti Israel character of many groups with the “normal” sets of relationships across likeminded groups with overlapping safe havens and supporters give the appearance of being “networked.” Arquilla, et al describe the all channel network of groups where every group is (or at least could be) connected to every other. However, without a much greater degree of information than we have available now, it is impossible to distinguish the all channel network that has every group connected to one another from many disparate groups that have a common enemy that they would like to strike.

Indeed Lewis Beam, the American Christian Identity “leader” in “leaderless resistance” argues that all individuals and all groups should operate independently of each other.

“Organs of information distribution, such as newspapers, leaflets, computers, etc. which are widely available to all, keep each person informed of events allowing for a planned response that will take many variations. NO one need issue an order to anyone (Beam 1992).”

Thus, how can one distinguish such a group from a truly linked network that employs a clandestine communication strategy unless you have rather complete documentation?

The milieu of these networks may be seen as composing, in addition to the members of the network, “supporters,” “acquiescers,” and “opponents.” These may be both governments and publics and need not be seen as unitary actors.

Two very important differences between Al Qaeda and most of the organizations and states that are presumed to be networked with it are the goals and modes of operation. Al Qaeda has engaged in actions that more resemble a desire to destroy than to bargain. The great bulk of the groups that use terror, do so in a coercive bargaining mode. They seek to extract concessions, gain recognition, and of course delegitimize regimes. They have clear political goals. States that sponsors, harbor or encourage them are using such organizations to pursue their foreign policy goals. Such groups have natural restraints when operating within their own territories. They cannot afford to alienate their own supporters by
engaging in actions that are difficult to justify as part of the pursuit of their strategic goals.

In the early stages of trying to build a coalition to fight the war, it appears that the U.S. government made the network as large as it could and implied significant control by Al Qaeda of this larger network beyond Al Qaeda itself to justify the need for the efforts to combat it. Coalition and potential coalition members as well as governments who sought arms, training and other forms of military aid also had incentives to describe a wide network.

Although Al-Qaeda functions independently of other terrorist organizations, it also functions through some of the terrorist organizations that operate under its umbrella or with its support, including: the Al-Jihad, the Al-Gamma Al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group - led by Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman and later by Ahmed Refai Taha, a/k/a "Abu Yasser al Masri,"), Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and a number of jihad groups in other countries, including the Sudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Somalia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bosnia, Croatia, Albania, Algeria, Tunisia, Lebanon, the Philippines, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, the Kashmiri region of India, and the Chechen region of Russia. Al-Qaeda also maintained cells and personnel in a number of countries to facilitate its activities, including in Kenya, Tanzania, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States. By banding together, Al-Qaeda proposed to work together against the perceived common enemies in the West - particularly the United States which Al-Qaeda regards as an "infidel" state which provides essential support for other "infidel" governments (Caruso, 2001)."

The administration has also argued at various points that Al Qaeda had links in the past with Syria, Libya, Iraq, Iran, and Sudan (and continue to be listed by the Department of State as State Sponsors of terrorism). The administration has also had to tip toe around the connections between the Pakistan Intelligence Services connections to Al Qaeda, the Taliban and the Harakat al Mujahedin operating in Kashmir against India, the financial connections between the Saudis and Bin Laden. Estimates of the number of persons who passed through the Al Qaeda training camps ranged as high as 25,000-30,000 dispersed to cells in more than sixty countries.

Now almost a year later the incentive to demonstrate success brings incentives to more carefully describe organizational connections and possibilities. For example in June, Johnson, Van Natta and Miller (2002) of the New York Times reported that senior officials suggest that although sworn members of Al Qaeda were estimated to number no more than 200 to 300 men, officials say that at its peak this broader Qaeda network operated about a dozen Afghan camps that trained as many as 5000 militants, who in turn created cells in as many as 60 countries.

In July, Rebecca Carr, a reporter with the Cox News Service, quoting two “senior FBI officials, wrote,
“Everyone tries to tie everything into 9/11 and al-Qaida,” said one of the two officials interviewed Friday on condition of anonymity. “There was a recent report suggesting that al-Qaida is about 5,000 strong. It is nowhere near 5,000 strong.”

“While thousands of Islamic extremists and future terrorists have passed through Mr. bin Laden’s training camps, it does not mean they are actual al Qaeda operatives, the officials said. The war in Afghanistan has successfully dispersed, killed or captured al-Qaeda leaders, leaving the terror network fractured and diffused… (Carr, 2002, A10)”

Nonetheless, the administration is left with the problem that, because of the manner in which they have chosen to describe the threat of the network, they cannot claim that their actions have actually reduced the threat of terror from occurring.

“Classified investigations of the Qaeda threat now under way at the F.B.I. and C.I.A have concluded that the war in Afghanistan failed to diminish the threat to the United States, the officials said. Instead, the war might have complicated counterterrorism efforts by dispersing potential attackers across a wider geographic area (and)... Officials emphasized that it was no longer possible simply to label all post-Sept. 1 plots as Al Qaeda inspired, because the new terror alliance has largely replaced the old bin Laden network (Johnston, Van Natta and Miller, 2002)."

C. Understanding and Countering Terrorism: War Fighting Strategies vs. Political and Law Enforcement Approaches

While we need be clear that there is no disagreement that the threat posed by Al Qaeda is real and that a response to that threat is required, I have argued above that there is a lack of agreement on the exact nature of the links, membership and boundaries of the “global network of terror,” and that the administration made a major mistake by approaching the problem they represent through a “war” strategy. Focusing primarily on the international side of the response, what then would be a more effective response?

I would argue that an effective Counterterrorism policy begins with recognizing that all counterterrorism responses must have two, interrelated goals and one underlying principle and that success is predicated upon them. The formulation of a response must begin with an understanding that the two primary purposes of a counterterrorism policy are to make the nation more secure and to make the public believe that they are. Failing on either amounts to a victory for the terrorist but as a process, failing to make the public believe that they are safe and that the political authorities are doing what they should is more of a threat to the political system than particular security lapses. The fact that this particular threat is based outside the United States and that the scope of possible operations and targets is anywhere on the globe, means that public and governmental perceptions within the international community are also important. Above all, countering terrorism involves the use of all the security forces of the state within the context of a political process. It is not simply about destroying the threat but how and how it is perceived that are involved. Therefore,

“The foremost principle must be the objective of the maintenance of democratic processes of government and rule of law ….Not only does failure to do so place the
While we recognize that new communication technologies have greatly increased the ability of disparate groups to communicate clandestinely and to spread their ideological message more easily and with far less cost, this does not mean that everything has changed and that all groups that practice terror are the same. While the last decade has seen the emergence of what may be described as groups who both seek to destroy rather than bargain and who have become less reliant on state sponsors and state support such as Al Qaeda, many groups remain who use terrorism “discriminately” and with particular political “bargains’ as goals (The UVF, IRA, ETA, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Tamil Tigers for example). Many terrorist groups therefore still need safe havens to operate and often the support of their host governments.

During the past thirty years the terrorists with the greatest success and the longest durability have been connected to serious long standing political causes, supported or at least tolerated, whether we approve or understand, by populations the terrorist declared themselves as representing. This terrorism, once it begins, simply does not disappear until the basic problems which underlie it are settled or until a military solution is imposed and a constant iron fist employed. Much of this type of terrorist violence follows a pattern connected to negotiations about potential conflict resolution (as in Northern Ireland), or the status of the peace talks (both to compel and destroy their occurrence) in Palestine and Israel. While it is convenient for political purposes to argue that one “devil” i.e. Moscow, the Ayatollah Khomeini, Qaddafi, Saddam Hussein or now Osama Bin Laden, is “behind it all,” the realities consistently point to particular grievances, in particular arenas, with particular goals. While various groups may cooperate or assist each other under certain circumstances, divorcing the reaction to them from the particulars of their origins and their goals is likely to create more problems than it solves. Militarily defeating such groups without managing the political problems that gave rise to them provides momentary respite not security.

More importantly, for the purposes of discussing the current “War Against Terrorism,” if you connect all the terrorism that occurs in the world is connected to Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda (or in earlier periods to any of the other devils), each terror attack become an unnecessary victory that you have handed to Bin Laden. The United State made this error twenty years ago with respect to Qaddafi, attributing terror attacks to him and thus increasing his standing within much of the radical Arab world. To connect the successful culmination of the war against terror to the absence of terrorism will be self defeating and further will increase the damage to the United States and its allies that any act of future terrorism will bring thus granting to Al Qaeda unnecessary “victories.”
In earlier work (Stohl, 1988:168-169) I argued that there were three forms of state terrorism in international relations.

Terrorist coercive diplomacy where the aim is to make the non-compliance in the words of Thomas Schelling, terrible beyond endurance is the first.

The second is Covert State terrorism which consists of two types of behaviors. The first is when state agents participate in covert terrorist operations. The second is when states covertly sponsor other state or private groups to undertake terrorist actions on their behalf.

The third form is Surrogate Terrorism, which also consists of two subtypes. The first occurs when third parties undertake actions which are subsequently supported by the interested state and the second is State acquiescence, where terrorism is undertaken by third parties and those actions are either not condemned or openly opposed.

When terrorists “hide-out” in states which have the capacity to “find them” and do not, we have an example of state acquiescence.

As much as we can tell, the war on terror targets terrorist groups, networks of terrorists and states that use both covert and surrogate terrorism as well as groups within states whose state authorities are too weak to combat them. We need to look at each of these types of behaviors to determine the appropriate strategies to combat them. We thus need to deter states from sponsoring terrorists, providing safe harbor or acquiescing to terrorists hiding in their midst.

One problem for the United States is that, to others, in addition to some U.S. behaviors (present and past), some of its new found friends and allies, as well as its long time adversaries engage in some of the very behaviors of which we accuse our enemies. A non-comprehensive list would include: Pakistan, which has long been accused of assisting Harakat ul Mujahidin (HUM), which is based in Pakistan (and until recently Afghanistan) and receives funding from “Saudi benefactors” for its campaign in Kashmir. Greece and Armenia stand accused of turning a blind eye to the activities of the PKK, the Kurdistan worker's party (Syria, Ira and Iran previously provided safe haven), which seeks to establish an independent Kurdish state in Southwest Turkey. The Russians accuse Georgia of turning a blind eye to the Chechens.

Secondly, while some of our friends and adversaries may be responsive to threats and thus deterred from future sponsorship, harboring or acquiescence, governments of weak, failing or failed states may not have the capacity to respond.

In building its diplomatic coalition and in its dispensing of military aid and training

The most serious problem arises where deterrence through state sponsors does not work because the “host” governments are either nonexistent (political "black holes" like Somalia) or too weak to control their whole territory (viz., FARC’s use of Panama and Ecuador, or Al Qaeda’s use of Yemen and Indonesia for training). Arafat’s Palestinian Authority, while not a recognized state, operates like a weak one, harboring the externally
supported Hamas and Islamic Jihad while unable and/or unwilling to control them (Radu, 2002)

In short, it doesn’t work when the state has failed or is so weak that it cannot control parts of its territory or confront groups operating on its soil.

At the same time, the United States needs to be more cognizant of the risks of its “partners” using the opportunity of fighting the “global terror network” to simply eliminate challenges to the current regime.

The membership of the “coalition against terrorism the nature of some the fighting in Afghanistan, and US moves elsewhere in the world imply future US acquiescence or active participation in some pretty nasty local conflicts, campaigns of military and/or police repression, and even state terror. This marks a return to the supportive approach of the United States during the cold War towards regimes engaged in the repression of alleged ‘communist’ oppositions- a tendency that faded somewhat after the end of the Cold War, though it was still applied to really key US allies like Turkey and Saudi Arabia (Lieven, 2002:250).

While Mr. Bush has thus far avoided one of the major traps of his predecessors, that of portraying the confrontation as one on one, or in terms of an attack on his “manhood,” the administration did of course focus on Osama Bin Laden, and allowed the attempted death and then search for Bin Laden to become much of the focus of the first year of the war. This is crucial not only for avoiding the trap of “personalizing” the issues but more importantly for misunderstanding the nature of the threat that Al Qaeda represents.

“It is important to avoid equating the bin Laden network solely with bin Laden. He represents a key node in the Arab Afghan terror network, but there should be no illusion about the likely effect on the network of actions taken to neutralize him. The network conducts many operations without his involvement, leadership, or financing – and will continue to be able to do so should he be killed or captured. (Arquilla, Ronfeldt and Zanini 1999:63)

Finally, the administration must recognize that counterterrorism policy cannot be divorced from foreign policy as a whole. One cannot call for global support on matters of interest to the United States and not expect requests to respond to interests of others. One cannot call for the rule of law and not support international law. To accomplish its counterterrorism purposes, The United States will need the cooperation of many other governments. While it is indisputably true that the United States has the military capacity to destroy unilaterally, it does not have the capacity to occupy and hold the territory of all the states that Mr. Bush and Mr. Rumsfeld have indicated are possibly on the list of states that sponsor or harbor terrorists. Afghanistan itself is proving this to be true for any that had any doubts.

In addition, The United States military cannot conduct military training programs or provide support in every country that needs assistance. Moreover, United States military forces cannot be seen as the sole support of a weak regime and
cannot be successful in the short or long term if it depends on predatory or highly repressive regimes as allies.

Combating terrorists and terrorist networks requires cooperation on information about terrorists, their movements and connections and their capture before they act. It is therefore within the scope of the intelligence, law enforcement, banking and diplomatic communities. It requires agreements and workable arrangements to enable the elimination of hideouts, the destruction of financial networks and other support structures. It might require sanctions, isolation and agreements to control or prohibit the flow of arms. All of which require multilateral cooperation not simply unilateral actions.

Enlisting allies and strengthening weak, failing and failed states requires not only investments in economic development but also assistance in developing good governance and democratic governance- both for failed states and partners in the “war on terror” as international publics support is crucial for assistance in removing support, acquiescence and fear of aiding the fight. Carrots and sticks are needed and this is best done in concert with partners- provide partners as well as other regimes diplomatic cover to do what needs to be done.

Failed States and protracted conflicts associated either with them or countries in their region have provided a volatile arena for the development of many terrorist organizations over the past thirty years. The longstanding conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis, accompanied by the 1970s failure of the Lebanese state and its continued weakness clearly created opportunities for various groups to transit, hide, train and deploy. Sudan and Afghanistan provided safe haven for Al Qaeda, Pakistan and India’s long running conflict over Kashmir creates the political context for Pakistani support for groups which seek to challenge India. Other failing states might be sowing the seeds of future conflicts.

Solving or at least more effectively managing the long standing conflicts between the Palestinians and the Israelis, and in Kashmir would go a long way in defusing much of the recruitment power of extremist/terrorist organizations who see the indifference or hostility of the world community as legitimizing their violent actions.

The danger that some failed states pose also reminds us that unresolved conflicts are always a potential danger. Protracted conflicts generate hatred and the desire for revenge, foster the emergence of groups whose main aim is to wage war, and empower leaders who depend on a climate of fear to justify their own rule. These conditions provide ideal breeding grounds for precisely the sort of people who willingly engage in mass terror. The terrorist network that the United States now seeks to eradicate is a product of the protracted conflicts in Afghanistan and Kashmir, and on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The September 11 attacks on the United States might never have occurred had these violent struggles been resolved. Thus, helping to settle protracted civil conflicts is not merely good for the world in general; it can also make the United States safer. (Walt, 2002: 62).

Conclusion
But Bush, to judge by his actions, appears to believe in a kind of unilateral civilization. Nato gets short shrift, the United Nations is an afterthought, treaties are not considered binding, and the administration brazenly sponsors protectionist measures at home such as new steel tariffs and farm subsidies. Any compromise of Washington's freedom to act is treated as a hostile act. To quash the International Criminal Court (ICC), for example, the administration threatened in June to withdraw all funds for UN peacekeeping. Global warming may be occurring, as an administration report finally admitted in the spring, but the White House nonetheless trashed the Kyoto Protocol that the international community spent ten years negotiating, and it offered no alternative plan.

But at the same time, the nature of the terrorist threat demonstrated the necessity of bolstering the international community, which is built on nonproliferation agreements, intelligence cooperation, and legitimizing institutions such as the un, as well as a broad consensus on democracy, free markets, and human rights. It also demonstrates the necessity of a values-driven foreign policy -- and of nation building under multilateral auspices in places such as Afghanistan (Hirsch, 2002).

Finally then, the United States will need to engage in multilateral responses within the context of existing international organizations, and understand that while others will not have the capacity to contribute to the military means that are necessary in the campaign that international cooperation on non-military means will provide the greater long-term effect in the campaign against the political sources of support for terrorist actions. Unlike the terrorists, counter-terrorists can deliver that power anywhere at any time without fear of being stopped. What it cannot do is necessarily deliver that power in a way that will automatically provide protection. Thus, in the end the United States will have to recognize that it will have to rely upon the kindness of strangers if it is going to effectively manage the long term threat of terrorism. That kindness will have to be reciprocated in the sharing of intelligence and assistance, respect for the underlying rules of the current international game and understanding of the needs of others and its own responsibilities to the international community.

The United States may not need military assistance to destroy but we need military assistance to rebuild and to hold. Fighting terrorism is not simply about winning military battles. How you fight, with whom you fight and against whom you fight are equally important in the long run tally of who won the war. You are not just fighting the "bad guys" but also what they purport to represent. Your image is part of the overall war.

In closing, it is useful to ponder the observations of Jeffrey Goldfarb, co-developer with Adam Michnik, of the "Democracy Seminar which takes place twice a year in Krakow and Cape Town and brings together students and activists to discuss the creation and sustenance of democratic structures". He reports on the reactions of the students-the very students he observes that should be the best allies the Untied States has in the long run- to this year's events. These students feel

"It is the war on terrorism that is being used as cover by dictators around the world to justify crackdown on democracy advocates. Suddenly the rights of Muslims in the Philippines and Indonesia-or the democratic critics of the authoritarian "Asian way" in Singapore, Malaysia and Burma- are not important to the Bush administration. Suddenly
the strategic resources of Central Asian dictatorships are more important than the lives of human rights activities. Suddenly the defense of the American way of life and our democracy seems to be predicated upon a lack of concern for the democratic rights of people in less advantage countries.

If US policies have created such views in our potential friends, the long term viability of the current policies is much in doubt. In the short term, as the debate on whether the United States should invoke a preemptive attack on Iraq, the administration’s war on terror has certainly not left me feeling any more secure or confident that we will be more secure in the long term. The administration, after a flurry of multilateral initiatives has reverted to its pre 9/11 behaviors and this does not portend well for preventing or assisting failed states or building a more peaceful future.

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Appendix One Terrorist and Terrorist Organizations Identified by the Bush Administration since September 11, 2001.

Comprehensive List of Terrorists and Groups Identified Under Executive Order 13224

Executive Order 13224, signed by President Bush on September 23, blocks the assets of organizations and individuals linked to terrorism. There are 189 such groups, entities, and individuals covered by the Executive Order. Following is a complete listing.

Original Annex: September 23, 2001

- al-Qaida/Islamic Army*
- Abu Sayyaf Group*
- Armed Islamic Group (GIA)*
- Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM)*
- al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad)*
- Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)*
- 'Asbat al-Ansar *
- Salafist Group for Preaching (Call) and Combat (GSPC) *
- Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (Al Jama'a al-Islamiyyah al-Muqatilah bi-Libya)
- al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI)
- Islamic Army of Aden
- Usama Bin Ladin (*Most Wanted* Terrorist)
- Muhammad Atif/Subhi Abu Sitta/Abu Hafs al-Masri (*Most Wanted* Terrorist—killed in Afghanistan)
- Sayf al-Adl (*Most Wanted* Terrorist)
- Shaykh Sa'id/Mustafa Muhammad Ahmad
- Abu Hafs the Mauritanian/Mahfouz Ould al-Walid/Khalid al-Shanqiti
- Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi
- Abu Zubaydah/Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn Tariq
- Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi/Abu Abdullah
- Ayman al-Zawahiri (*Most Wanted* Terrorist)
- Thirwat Salah Shihata/Muhammad Ali
- Tariq Anwar al-Sayyid Ahmad/Fathi/Amr al-Fath
- Muhammad Salah/Nasr Fahmi Nasr Hasanayn
- Makhttab al-Khidamat/Al-Khifaf
- Wafa Humanitarian Organization
- al-Rashid Trust
- Mamoun Darkazanli Import-Export Company

(Note: Groups with asterisks are also designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Designated on 12 October 2001

"Most Wanted" Terrorists
Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah
Muhsin Musa Matwalli Atwah
Ahmed Khalfan Ghaïlanî
Ahmed Mohammed Hamed Ali
Fazul Abdullah Mohammed
Mustafa Mohamed Fadhil
Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan
Fahid Mohammed Ally Msalam
Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani
Ahmed Mohammed Hamed Ali
Fazul Abdullah Mohammed
Mustafa Mohamed Fadhil
Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan
Fahid Mohammed Ally Msalam
Anas al-Liby
Abdul Rahman Yasin
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
Abdelkarim Hussein Mohamed al-Nasser
Ahmad Ibrahim al-Mughassil
Ali Saed bin Ali al-Hoorie
Ibrahim Salih Mohammed al-Yacoub
Ali Atwa
Hasan Izz-al-Din
Imad Fayez Mugniyah

Others

Rabita Trust
Jaish-e-Muhammad
al-Hamati Sweets Bakeries
al-Nur Honey Press Shops (aka: Al-Nur Honey Center)
Chafiq bin Muhammad al-Ayadi
Dr. Amin al-Haq (Dr. Amin ul-Haq)
Jamyah Taawun al-Islamia (aka: Society of Islamic Cooperation)
Mohammad Zia
Mufti Rashid Ahmad Ladeyaznoy (Karachi, Pakistan)
Muhammad al-Hamati (aka: Muhammad Hamdi Sadiq al-Ahdel)
Omar Mahmoud Uthman (aka: Abu Qatada al-Filistini)
Tohir Yuldashev
Mamoun Darkazanli
Saqar al-Jadawi
Ahmad Said al-Kadr
Sad al-Sharif
Bilal bin Marwan
al-Shifa Honey Press for Industry and Commerce
Haji Abdul Manan Agha
Yasin al-Qadi (aka: Shaykh Yassin Abdullah Kadi)
Riad Hijazi

Designated on 2 November 2001

Abu Nidal organization (ANO)
Aum Shinrikyo
Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)
al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group)
HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement)
Hizballah (Party of God)
Kahane Chai (Kach)
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)
• Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
• Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)
• National Liberation Army (ELN)
• Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
• Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
• Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
• Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)
• Real IRA
• Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
• Revolutionary Nuclei (possible successor to ELA)
• Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17 November)
• Revolutionary People’s Liberation Army/Front (DHKP/C)
• Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL)
• United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)

(Note: All 22 groups also are designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.)

**Designated on 7 November 2001**

- Aaran Money Wire Service, Inc
- al Baraka Exchange LLC
- al-Barakaat
- al-Barakaat Bank
- al-Barakat Bank of Somalia (BSS)
- al-Barakat Finance Group
- al-Barakat Financial Holding Co
- al-Barakat Global Telecommunications
- al-Barakat Group of Companies Somalia Limited
- al-Barakat International (a.k.a. Baraco Co)
- al-Barakat Investments
- al-Barakat Wiring Service
- al Taqwa Trade, Property and Industry Company Limited,
- ASAT Trust
- Bank al Taqwa Limited
- Baraka Trading Company
- Barakaat Boston
- Barakaat Construction Company
- Barakaat Enterprise
- Barakaat Group of Companies
- Barakaat International
- Barakaat International Foundation
- Barakaat International, Inc
- Barakaat North America, Inc
- Barakaat Red Sea Telecommunications
- Barakaat Telecommunications Co Somalia
- Barakat Bank and Remittances
- Barakat Computer Consulting (BCC)
- Barakat Consulting Group (BCG)
- Barakat Global Telephone Company
- Barakat International Companies (BICO)
- Barakat Post Express (BPE)
- Barakat Refreshment Company
• Barakat Wire Transfer Company
• Barakat Telecommunications Company Limited (BTELCO)
• Barako Trading Company, LLC
• Global Services International
• Heyatul Ulya
• Nada Management Organization
• Parka Trading Company
• Red Sea Barakat Company Limited
• Somalia International Relief Organization
• Somali Internet Company
• Somali Network AB
• Youssef M. Nada & Co. Gesellschaft MBH
• Youssef M. Nada
• Hussein Mahmud Abdulkadir
• Abdirasik Aden
• Abbas Abdi Ali
• Abdi Adulaziz Ali
• Yusaf Ahmed Ali
• Dahir Ubeidullahi Aweys
• Hassan Dahir Aweys
• Garad Jama
• Ali Ghaleb Himmat
• Albert Friedrich Armand Huber
• Liban Hussein
• Ahmed Nur Ali Jim‘ale
• Abdullahi Hussein Kahie
• Mohamed Mansour
• Zeinab Mansour-Fattouh
• Youssef Nada

**Designated on 4 December 2001**

• Holy Land Foundation
• Beit El-Mal Holdings
• al-Aqsa Islamic Bank

**Designated on 20 December 2001**

• Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LET)
• Ummah Tameer e-Nau (UTN)
• Sultan Bashir-ud-Din Mahmood
• Abdul Majeed
• Mahammed Tufail

**Designated on 31 December 2001**

• Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)
• Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF)
• Orange Volunteers (OV)
• Red Hand Defenders (RHD)
• Ulster Defence Association/Ulster Freedom Fighters (UDA/UFF)
• First of October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO)
Designated on 9 January 2002

- Afghan Support Committee (ASC)
- Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS) (NOTE: Only the Pakistan and Afghanistan offices of the entity have been designated.)
- Abd al-Muhsin al Libi
- Abu Bakr al-Jaziri

Designated on 26 February 2002

- Javier Abaunza Martinez
- Itziar Alberdi Uranga
- Angel Alcalde Linares
- Miguel Albisu Iriarte
- Eusebio Arzallus Tapia
- Paulo Elcoro Ayastuy
- Antonio Agustín Figal Arranz
- Eneko Gogeascoechea Arronategui
- Cristina Goiricelaya Gonzalez
- María Soledad Iparraguirre Guenechea
- Gracia Morcillo Torres
- Ainhoa Múgica Goñí
- Aloña Muñoz Ordozgoiti
- Juan Jesús Narvaez Goñi
- Juan Antonio Olarra Guridi
- Zigor Orbe Sevillano
- Mikel Otegui Unanue
- Jon Iñaki Perez Aramburu
- Carlos Saez de Eguilaz Murguiondo
- Kemen Uranga Artola
Foreign Terrorist Organizations

Foreign Terrorist Organizations are foreign organizations that are designated by the Secretary of State in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended. FTO designations play a critical role in our fight against terrorism and are an effective means of curtailing support for terrorist activities and pressuring groups to get out of the terrorism business.

Identification

The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the State Department (S/CT) continually monitors the activities of terrorist groups active around the world to identify potential targets for designation. When reviewing potential targets, S/CT looks not only at the actual terrorist attacks that a group has carried out, but also at whether the group has engaged in planning and preparations for possible future acts of terrorism or retains the capability and intent to carry out such acts.

Designation

Once a target is identified, S/CT prepares a detailed "administrative record," which is a compilation of information, typically including both classified and open sources information, demonstrating that the statutory criteria for designation have been satisfied. If the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury, decides to make the designation, Congress is notified of the Secretary's intent to designate the organization and given seven days to review the designation, as the INA requires. Upon the expiration of the seven-day waiting period, notice of the designation is published in the Federal Register, at which point the designation takes effect. An organization designated as an FTO may seek judicial review of the designation in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit not later than 30 days after the designation is published in the Federal Register.

FTO designations expire automatically after two years, but the Secretary of State may redesignate an organization for additional two-year period(s), upon a finding that the statutory criteria continue to be met. The procedural requirements for designating an organization as an FTO also apply to any redesignation of that organization. The Secretary of State may revoke a designation or redesignation at any time upon a finding that the circumstances that were the basis for the designation or redesignation have changed in such a manner as to warrant revocation, or that the national security of the United States warrants a revocation. The same procedural requirements apply to revocations made by the Secretary of State as apply to designations or redesignations. A designation may also be revoked by an Act of Congress, or set aside by a Court order.

Legal Criteria for Designation

(Reflecting Amendments to Section 219 of the INA in the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001)

1. It must be a foreign organization.
2. The organization must engage in terrorist activity, as defined in section 212 (a)(3)(B) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)), or terrorism, as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2)), or retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism.
3. The organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) of the United States.

Legal Ramifications of Designation

1. It is unlawful for a person in the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to knowingly provide "material support or resources" to a designated FTO. (The
term "material support or resources" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) as "currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, except medicine or religious materials.

2. Representatives and members of a designated FTO, if they are aliens, are inadmissible to and, in certain circumstances, removable from the United States (see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182 (a)(3)(B)(i)(IV)-(V), 1227 (a)(1)(A)).

3. Any U.S. financial institution that becomes aware that it has possession of or control over funds in which a designated FTO or its agent has an interest must retain possession of or control over the funds and report the funds to the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Department of the Treasury.

Other Effects of Designation

1. Supports our efforts to curb terrorism financing and to encourage other nations to do the same.
2. Stigmatizes and isolates designated terrorist organizations internationally.
3. Deters donations or contributions to and economic transactions with named organizations.
4. Heightens public awareness and knowledge of terrorist organizations.
5. Signals to other governments our concern about named organizations.

Background

- In October 1997, then-Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright approved the designation of the first 30 groups as FTOs.
- In October 1999, Secretary Albright redesignated 27 of these groups as FTOs but determined that three organizations should not be redesignated.
- Secretary Albright designated one additional FTO in 1999 (al-Qa’ida) and another in 2000 (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan).
- Secretary of State Colin L. Powell designated two additional FTOs (Real IRA and United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia) in 2001.
- In October 2001, Secretary Powell redesignated 25 of the 28 FTOs whose designations were due to expire, combining two previously designated groups (Kahane Chai and Kach) into one.
- Secretary Powell has designated five additional FTOs (Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, Asbat al-Ansar, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e Tayyiba and Salafist Group for Call and Combat) between October 2001 and July 2002.

Current List of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (as of August 2002)

1. Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)
2. Abu Sayyaf Group
3. Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
4. Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
5. Asbat al-Ansar
6. Aum Shinrikyo
7. Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)
8. Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group)
9. HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement)
10. Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM)
11. Hizballah (Party of God)
12. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
13. Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) (Army of Mohammed)
14. al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad)
15. Kahane Chai (Kach)
16. Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)
17. Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LT) (Army of the Righteous)
18. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
19. Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)
20. National Liberation Army (ELN)
21. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
22. Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
23. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
24. PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC)
25. al-Qa’ida
26. Real IRA
27. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
28. Revolutionary Nuclei (formerly ELA)
29. Revolutionary Organization 17 November
30. Revolutionary People’s Liberation Army/Front (DHKP/C)
31. Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC)
32. Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL)
33. United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)

Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA)