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"Failed States and International Security:
Causes, Prospects, and Consequences"

Purdue University, West Lafayette
February 25-27, 1998

Grasping the Undemocratic Peace.
The Case of Latin America

by Lothar Brock

Address of the author
Lothar Brock
FB 03/Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universitaet
D-60054 Frankfurt
Email: brock@soz.uni-frankfurt.de

According to Charles Tilly (1990), wars make states and states make war. The number of states in the present world has quadrupled since World War II, due to decolonization and the break-up of the Soviet Empire. The United Nations was founded by forty-four states, today it has some 180 members. Yet contrary to what Tilly's aphorism implies, the number of international wars is going down while the number of intra-state wars remains high and in some regions is going up (Wallensteen/Sollenberg 1996). How can we account for this state of affairs? How can there be international order and intranational disorder [1]?

In their book on the `real world order' Max Singer and Aaron Wildawsky observe the formation of `zones of peace' and `zones of turmoil' (Singer/Wildawski 1996). However, the `zones of turmoil' are also marked by a relative absence of international war. Has this to be viewed as a passing phenomenon? Will the international system return to `normalcy', i.e. to a state of international war, after the internal wars in the `zones of turmoil' have been fought out and more states will evolve which would be capable of waging international war?

I want to take up these questions by looking into the democratic peace proposition in the light of the Latin American experience with peace and war on the international level. As a region with some twenty-odd states, Latin America has suffered relatively few international but numerous internal wars. Up to the 1990s, Latin America has been a region of `internal conflict and international peace' (Calvert 1969). I want to find out to which extent the democratic peace proposition can help to analyze the relative absence of international war in Latin America and to which extent it has to be modified with a view to the Latin American experience.

Assumptions

According to Bruce Russett empirical evidence that democracies in general are unlikely to go to war with each other by now can be considered as “extremely robust, in that by various criteria of war and militarized diplomatic disputes, and various measures of democracy, the relative rarity of violent conflict between democracies still holds up”. [2] Jack Levy even claims that if anything, then the absence of war between democracies could be regarded “as an empirical law” in international relations theory (Levy 1989, 88). Yet the democratic peace proposition remains contested on various grounds. [3] David E. Spiro objects that the samples used in order to empirically verify the thesis are too small (Spiro 1994, 1997). Christopher Layne refers to a number of “near misses”, where democracies moved to the brink of fighting each other (Layne 1994). From a neo-realist viewpoint, the proposition is flawed from the start since states' behavior is determined by the structure of the international system and not by state-society relations. Thus John Mearsheimer claims that non-fighting among democracies during the past fifty years was historically contingent and that the recent change of the security environment may lead to increased hostilities among states (including the possibility of a return to intra-European war) regardless of the properties of their political systems or state-society relations (Mearsheimer 1990; Waltz 1993).

The present paper approaches the debate under a different perspective. First of all, instead of looking into the correlation between peace and democracy, it addresses the possibility of peace among states which do not constitute `mature Western democracies'. Secondly, the paper takes up Ido Oren's plea to pay more attention to the `subjectivity of the democratic peace' which he demonstrates with a view to the contingency of classifications of states as democracies or non-democracies (Oren 1995).

As to the first consideration, Michael Doyle states that `there are many reasons not to go to war other than liberalism' (1997, 366). Among these he mentions distance, exhaustion or deterrence. However, as Doyle also points out, this is not the kind of peace the democratic peace proposition has in mind. The latter rather refers to a stable expectation among states that they will not resort to the use of military force in their mutual relations. The question then is, whether such a stable expectation of peace (or non-war) can develop among non-democracies.

Gerald Segal has recently observed that the clash between Taiwan and China of 1995-6 would not have happened under the former authoritarian regimes in both countries. According to Segal, President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan facing the first free presidential elections in Chinese history, felt he had to win backing from the centre ground of the electorate (...) by shifting to greater support for an enhanced international role for Taiwan.” Similarly, “authoritarian China under Mao could decide more easily (as in 1958) to step back from a crisis in the Taiwan Straits than can the current leadership, which cannot afford to be seen to be weak on nationalist issues”. (Segal 1997, 238, 240). So according to this argument, authoritarian regimes, because they act with more autonomy vis a vis their societies, may be better prepared to resist the lure of popular `crusades' against imagined or real enemies than democracies are (cf. Soerensen 1992, 399-400). Using a contrasting argument but arriving at the same conclusion, Stanislav Andreski (1980) has found that military dictatorships are hesitant to indulge in international military adventures because the domestic basis for doing so (i.e. for mobilizing support and resources) is too small and they risk loosing power (as the Argentinean military actually did after the Falkland-Malvinas war of 1982). Gleditsch and Hegre distinguish three levels of analysis and come to the conclusion that on the inter-state level their are indications that autocratic dyads show less proneness to war than mixed dyads (1997, 29). As Gates/Knutsen/Moses (1997, 3) point out, the data processed by Russett and associates (Russett 1993, 79) suggest that next to democratic dyads “anocratic” dyads show the lowest incidence of war, whereby “anocratic” according to Ted Gurr's regime types refers to a polity with a low degree of power and institutionalization (Gurr 1974, 1487). So the field seems to be wide open and there obviously is the need to avoid the assumption of direct, let alone monodirectional causal relationships between types of state-society relations and the incidence of war (Gates/Knutsen/Moses 1996). This leads directly to the second methodological consideration which underlies my approach, the subjectivity of the democratic peace.

The paper stresses the importance of `soft facts' as points of reference in a democratic peace policy. Soft facts refer to realities in which external givens and perceptions merge. In this respect, the paper joins, though cautiously, those who plead for a constructivist opening of the debate on the democratic peace (Risse-Kappen 1994a; Peceny 1997). Mark Peceny, in taking up the theoretically embattled issue of the Spanish-American War, has demonstrated how a constructivist approach can help to cope with cases which opponents of the democratic peace proposition tend to take as proof that the latter is untenable while proponents of the thesis define such cases away as irrelevant (cf. Oren 1995 with a view to the classification of late 19th century England, France and Germany). Peceny pleads for a combination of a `structural idealist' approach à la Wendt (1992) or Kratochwil/Koslowksi (1994) with a more Gramscian critique of ideology. I suggest to go one step further down this road of eclecticism and to take ideational, institutional and structural factors into account. Thus I will proceed on the following assumption:

Neither the properties of the political systems of states nor the structure of the international system as such determine the external behavior of states. The latter rather reflects preferences (emanating from specific state-society relations embodied in the political system and the belief systems of societies), external challenges (reflecting international competition for scarce resources) and institutionalized practices both on the national and the international levels (reflecting the internalization of norms and rules). States behavior therefore has to be seen, as Andrew Moravcsik has recently pointed out (1997, 520), in the context of policy interdependence, according to which `the pattern of transnational externalities resulting from attempts to pursue national distinctive purposes (...) imposes a binding constraint on state behavior'. If we understand policy interdependence in terms of a distinctive international milieu, state behavior may be regarded as a function of state-society relations and the international milieu in which the states interact. This milieu, in turn, is constituted by external givens (data) and by perceptions as they form under the influence of specific state-society relations and institutionalized practices. State-society relations and institutionalized practices also reflect identities which can be regarded as both, an outcome and a shaping force of the political process. [4]

Under this assumption the democratic peace proposition should not be read as excluding the possibility of war among democracies, but rather as stating that democracies are unlikely to wage war in an international milieu perceived to be in accord with the norms and procedures which come to bear in their domestic political processes. Vice versa, state-society relations characterized by instability and violence as such do not lead to the use of force in external relations. Whether internal conflicts are externalized in the form of war depends on both, the specific patterns of state-society relations in each state and the (perceived) international milieu.

Accounting for Peace. Theoretical Propositions

The mainstream critique of war in the 18th century, both in America and on the Continent revolved around the idea that war does not pay. This implied that rulers could be persuaded to refrain from waging war in their own interest because, as Friedrich Gentz would state at the turn of the century, with the growing complexity of international economic relations even a victory turned into defeat. This thesis, if anything, gained in popularity in the 19th and 20th centuries. The Manchester School around Richard Cobden used it to justify the call for free trade. In the early 20th century it served to justify the call for peace. Norman Angel depicted the hope to gain from war as “The Great Illusion”. David Mitrany, in the interwar period, took up the issue with his concept of functional cooperation which was to turn peace building right side up (from World Federation to functionally specific problem solving). Finally, in the context of the wider debate on interdependence which unfolded in the 70s, Richard Rosecrance developed his concept of the Trading State. Rosecrance claimed that for the developed economies it had become definitely more profitable to expand economically than to conquer territory. [5]

However, the concept of peace through economic interdependence from the very beginning has met with skepticism. Kant argued that interstate interdependence was not enough to prevent war. Under the impact of the French revolution (which he welcomed while his pupil Gentz detested it), Kant argued that the crucial point was the lack of identity between those who decided on waging war and those who had to suffer the consequences. If the latter were to decide they would “think twice” (“sie würden sich sehr bedenken”) before opting for war because they stood to gain little and to risk much. This implied that it was in the interest not of the rulers but of the ruled to refrain from war and that therefore, in order to bring about peace, feudalism had to be replaced by a “republican” order. However, Kant did not say, that those who had to carry the burden of war under no circumstances would decide in favor of war. They would just be more careful in their decisions concerning war and peace. In principle, the people, just like the rulers, under certain conditions could hope to be able to win more than they feared to loose by war.

Therefore Kant was quite aware of the necessity of going beyond participatory government. He pleaded for some multilateral bond between the republics which primarily was not outward directed as a defense against the remaining non-republics but actually was to serve as a vehicle for communication and cooperation among the republics themselves. This “federation” or rather “confederation” of free states was to be based on a law of cosmopolitan citizenship which would recognize the right of every human being to be respected and left unharmed even outside the reach of the law of his home country. This law was to foster a world-wide hospitality (as opposed to colonialism) which in turn would help to strengthen the material and immaterial bonds between people around the world (Doyle 1983, 1996, 1997; Schmidt 1996).

The democratic peace debate of our days revolves around the task of specifying and supplementing the Kantian argument. The respective efforts have been conveniently summarized by Bruce Russett in his seminal 1993 study on the democratic peace.

Russett distinguishes two sets of arguments in favor of the democratic peace that come to play: structural and institutional constraints of the external behavior of political units on the one hand, norms and culture on the other. The first set of arguments implies that decision-makers in a situation of international conflict between democracies can expect their counterparts to be controlled by essentially the same checks and balances preventing themselves from overreacting or from avoiding peaceful settlements (Russett 1993, 38sq.).

The second set of arguments refers to the political culture of democracies. If the latter is characterized by a readiness to engage in dialogue in order to reach compromise than democracies are likely to meet in the mutual expectations that all efforts will be made to settle controversies between them in a way that takes account of the interests of both sides (Russett 1993, 30sq.). Referring to political culture in this context implies that the norms governing public affairs are internalized by all and not simply imposed by force or the threat of force. Only to the degree that this is the case can democratic norms become effective in a setting in which there is no overriding law and no monopoly of legitimate power to enforce it.

The above implies that participatory government in order to unfold its pacifying function needs another participatory government as a counterpart. Democratic peace comes (at least) in pairs or it does not come at all. From this it follows that mutuality is a salient feature of the democratic peace. Though the democratic peace thesis establishes the importance of domestic factors in external behavior, the need for mutuality points to the crucial role played by the external environment (milieu) for the sustainability of a policy of peaceful settlement of disputes. The crucial issue here is, however, that mutuality is not only constituted by "hard facts", id est by regime attributes which are there for everyone to see and which leave no doubt over space and time as to their interpretation or evaluation. Rather, mutuality, though perhaps to a changing degree, is also subjective. As Peceny demonstrates, US perception of Spain before the Spanish-American War ignored the signs of a democratic transformation in Spain. Instead, Spain was viewed as the incarnation of all evil, while the movement for independence in Cuba, conversely, was viewed as a continuation of the American fight for freedom, as an expression of the American heritage (Peceny 1997). [6] Oren has demonstrated how classification of late 19th century Germany differs over time when present day classifications are compared with those by Woodrow Wilson or John Burgess (1890) (Oren 1995). The variations in the perception of other countries cannot be accounted for by referring exclusively either to interests or to beliefs. It seems more plausible to recognize the importance of both, interests which are being clad in certain perceptions in order to justify action in pursuit of the interests, and beliefs or convictions concerning the other which are the expression of the norms and culture prevailing in a country and as such go beyond mere instrumental ideologies.

In sum, it seems fair to argue that democracies due to their internal features are especially geared to foster the idea of international unity and to open up for the establishment of those material and immaterial bonds between societies and economies which in turn will strengthen the willingness to compromise and to cooperate. Ideas and norms geared towards cooperation this way would produce institutionalized practices which in turn would reify cooperative ideas and norms (Weede 1995). However, the democratic peace proposition gains in reach if subjective aspects of the problematique are taken into account. In this respect it may be understood to address the inter-action between state-society relations and their perceptions across two or more states with special reference to the question to what degree a pair or a group of countries is understood to form a pacific union. [7] To what extent can this conceptualization of the democratic peace problematique help to explain the Latin American experience, and to what extent does the Latin American experience call for a revision of the concept?

Undemocratic Peace in Latin America

Latin America is the product of war. The conquest of the region by the Europeans proceeded as a violent projection of the reconquista onto non-European grounds. Decolonization, with the exception of Brazil, again was accomplished by the application of collective violence. Violence continued after independence. But it was mostly in the form of internal war. After the Parguayan War (1864-1870) and the War of the Pacific (1879-1883), the latter constituting one of the few `classical' international wars in Latin America, international war in the region ceased to be a serious and continuing challenge to the international order in the region if it ever did constitute such a challenge at all.

According to the Hamburg Research Group on the Causes of War (AKUF), 75 wars were fought in Latin America between 1850 and 1990. [8] Out of these 21 could be defined as international wars between Latin American and Caribbean states. Many of these wars, unfortunately not all of them, were of the nature of locally confined encounters and most were fought in the context of creating states after decolonization a process which encompassed the bloodiest of all international wars in Latin America, the already mentioned Parguayan war (1864-1870) in which three forth of the prewar population of Paraguay were killed. [9] The number of international wars between Latin American (incl. Caribbean) states went down from twelve between 1850 and 1900, to seven between 1900 and 1950, and finally to four between 1950 and 1990 of which only one occurred in South America (Peru-Ecuador border conflict). In contrast, the number of internal wars went from sixteen in the first period to twelve in the second, rising to twenty one in the third period.

The political systems of most of the Latin American states during the entire period were in flux. After independence all Latin American countries made formal concessions to the liberal bourgeois ideology of the nineteenth century. [10] The US constitution formally served as a model for many new constitutions. So did the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (Wiarda 1990, 17). Latin American politicians and writers liked to present themselves to be the true custodians of the enlightenment in America whose mission it was to secure its heritage during the times of counterrevolution in Europe. However, the wholesale embrace of democracy served only as the emphatic frame in which various non-democratic safeguards against `disorder' were provided for in the political systems. Among these were the dominance of the executive branch of government, the lacking independence of the judiciary, and the role assigned to the armed forces as guarantor of the constitutional order, a role which, as Wiarda states, `elevated the military into almost a fourth branch of government' (Wiarda 1990, 18). This order combined a specific weakness for strong leaders (caudillos) with a social stratification that was incarnated in the hacienda system on the one hand, clientelistic relations between political power holders and their social basis on the other. The order thus established did not brake with the old hispanic traditions but was rooted in the latter (Wiarda 1995, ch.8). It rested on an organic and corporatist understanding of the state. [11]

Since control of the state institutions implied also control over material resources, there was an ongoing struggle over the access to state power with a concomitant tendency to hold on to it by all means on the part of those who had achieved access. The result was forcefully (but to no avail) lamented by Francisco Bilboa from Chile in 1862: `We have behind us a half-century of independence from Spain. How many years of true liberty have any of the new nations enjoyed? That is difficult to say; it is easier to reckon the years of anarchy and despotism that they have endured.' All political groupings, Bilboa complained, had come to rely on repression to further the cause of emancipation: `The conservatives, the reds, the liberals, the democrats, the Unitarians, the Federalists, all have embraced dictatorship. With the best of intentions the parties genially proclaim: “dictatorship in order to do good”.' [12]

In the last third of the 19th century, Latin America was systematically integrated into the international division of labor as it developed in the wake of the second industrial revolution. This entailed a substantial expansion of export-oriented economic activities accompanied by a high influx of foreign capital which was invested not only in extractive undertakings (plantations, mining) but also in infrastructural modernization. This process interacted with political change which was not uniform but in general did not overcome the basic characteristics of the Latin American political order outlined above. [13] In Mexico, Porfirio Diaz established what would have been called in the 1970s a development dictatorship. While under his rule considerable progress was made, both with a view to infrastructure and economic modernization, this very success unleashed social tensions which erupted in the Mexican Revolution. The latter was supposed to bring about a more equitable society and a self-determined economic development but ended with the establishment of the long-lasting one-party rule of the PRI which is only now beginning to make room for more political pluralism.

In Argentina rapid economic development went together with a consolidation of central political authority under the “generation of the 1880s” which, in accord with the export-led growth, was rooted in the class of great landowners and the wealthy merchants connecting the needs of the former with the world market. The facade of democratic government in the form of a parliament was kept in place, but, just as in Mexico after the Revolution, the ruling class in Argentina established some kind of one-party rule (unicato) by the National Autonomist party which was formed for this purpose (Keen/Wasserman 1988, 219). Under its rule, the economy boomed and illiteracy fell dramatically, but the distribution of property and income changed just as dramatically in favor of the large landowners, whose number expanded as land taken away from the pampas Indians in the `conquest of the desert' (1879-80) was sold of in huge tracts at nominal prices to military officers and politicians. As the export-led boom faltered, political opposition mounted. It was partly based on the new urban (middle) class which organized in the Radical Party but also on the incipient working class gathering in the Socialist Party. After almost two decades of partly violent struggle an electoral law was passed in 1912 constituting universal male suffrage and preparing the way for a retreat of the old ruling class even before the old division of labor on which its power rested collapsed in the World Economic Crisis of 1929.

At the same time at which Argentina forced its internal territorial consolidation in the `conquest of the desert' Chile turned its armed forces, which had just won the `War of the Pacific' against Peru and Bolivia (1879), inward against the Araucanians. The defeat of the Araucanians in 1882, just as the `conquest of the desert' in Argentina, opened up a vast new frontier in the South. But political modernization in Chile started earlier than in Argentina. The enormously rising state revenue from nitrate and copper exports lead to an expansion of government activities in the fields of public education and public works. However, unlike Argentina, were the depression of the 90s weakened the old oligarchy, in Chile falling copper and nitrate prices as well as inflation stopped the emergence of a progressive development pattern. With the help of a rebel army, a coalition of the old landowners, bankers, merchants and mining interests closely linked to British capital took over. This in turn, led to social struggles spurred by the Chilean Socialist party which was much more revolutionary and much stronger than the Argentine Socialist party. Their strikes, however, continued to be subdued by brutal force causing a great number of casualties on the side of the Socialists.

In Brazil, [14] the victorious anti-colonial revolt of 1889 led to the proclamation of a federal constitution guaranteeing private property as well as the freedom of press, speech, and assembly. However, this meant little in the cities and almost nothing in the vast hinterlands. The large landowners controlled entire populations in their reach, military formations organized and commanded by self-styled commanders fought private wars and certain territories were exposed to large-scale banditry (from which, however, poor people suffered less than they often did from the reign of the landlords). When a labor movement began to form in Brazil after the turn of the century, its activists were deported, imprisoned or sent to forced labor on the construction site of a “rubber”-railroad in Matto Grosso. Thousands lost their lives from tropical diseases for this undertaking which, due to falling rubber prices, soon became obsolete.

While the Latin American economies had followed not only the ups but also the downs of the international economy quite closely, there is general agreement that the period from the early 1870s till the end of the 1920s allowed considerable growth and modernization. The break-down of the international division of labor in 1929 and the ensuing depression brought this period of export-led development (crecimiento hacia afuera) to an abrupt end. This had not only economic but also considerable political repercussions. As far as economic policy is concerned, there was the much debated shift to importsubstitution. Contrary to what might be expected, this shift was an expression of the existing social power balance in most of the Latin states, not of its collapse: Importsubstitution was chosen because it allowed for a compromise between the interests of the industrial bourgeoisie and of the landed oligarchy (which were linked to each other via cross-cutting economic engagements anyhow). On the other hand, the role of the state in the economy expanded and with this the institutional framework of reference for the representation of economic interests changed. Thus in Mexico, the Cardenas government nationalized American oil interests expanding the state sector considerably. At the same time it made serious efforts to take up, if belatedly, some of the social aims of the Mexican revolution without, however, abandoning one-party rule.

In Brazil, Getulio Vargas proclaimed the estado novo which in many respects took up fascist development schemes though the `new state' was not based on totalitarian control but rather on populist alliances. In Argentina, Juan Peron institutionalized populism as the socio-political basis of a relatively open corporate state, while in Chile the political struggle to cope with the new situation lead to a brief alliance between socialist and bourgeois forces in a popular front (frente popular). Not only in these advanced countries but also in others, the ideology of state-led economic modernization, combined with some form of social equity and institutional reform, became popular. Thus Guatemala, in 1940, gave itself a constitution which perfectly matched the most advanced social-democratic ideas for reform of the time.

All this did not imply, that democracy was now finally on the doorstep of most of the Latin American countries, but rather that there was a historic optimism that democracy and social progress were possible, an optimism that was nourished by the positive effects of World War II on the Latin American economies. The war functioned as some sort of externally induced protectionism. It led to substantial export earnings which could have been invested in internal industrialization had the latter not been misguided from the beginning through its orientation towards importsubstitution. As things stood, there was no sufficient heavy industry basis anywhere in Latin America to expand manifacturing. Importsubstitution became more and more dependent on the import of machines in order to expand manufacturing of consumer goods.

Since the import of machines was blocked during the war, many Latin American countries amassed substantial foreign currency reserves. When the war ended these reserves could not be used right away for importing investment goods since there was, due to the war, a shortage of machinery on the world market. Thus the money was partly spent for consuming purposes and partly simply evaporated into the thin air of state clientelism which had received a big boost through the expansion of state bureaucracy. Especially the most advanced countries suffered from the contradictions of importsubstitution in its famous second phase (leading to an increasing demand for investment goods which had to be imported). But in all countries the promises of development nationalism, populism and reformism were broken.

As a result, the late forties and early fifties saw a wave of coups d'etat which were to little avail with a view to solving the problems underlying social tensions. In a counter move, at the end of the fifties, there seemed to develop new chances for democratization. Most spectacular, incumbent dictators in Venezuela and Cuba were ousted. But in Cuba it was more than that, it was the beginning of a social revolution which had the potential of igniting revolutionary movements in other parts of the region (including newly democratized Venezuela). As is well known, the US-Administration first under Eisenhower, than under Kennedy, responded by putting pressure on Cuba and by taking up Latin American demands for closer economic cooperation. Thus the Inter-American Development Bank (which the Latin Americans had asked for since 1940) was finally created and the Alliance for Progress (which took up an idea of Brazilian President Kubitschek) was called into life. One of the central tasks of the Alliance was to foster democratization in Latin America in combination with landreform and the diversification of economic activities. However, hardly had the American republics professed to pursue these tasks when a succession of coups forced the US-Administration to give up its proclaimed policy of non-recognition. Most important in this respect was the military coups in Brazil, in 1964, which was sparked off by the landreform policy of the Goulart government. With this coup and the prompt recognition of the military government by the US, the Alliance for Progress and with it the scheme for democratization which it embodied were dead.

What followed was the said story all over which Francisco Bilboa had bemoaned one hundred years earlier: as guerilla wars spread in Latin America, as the contradictions of the old importsubstitution policy sharpened, as Third World efforts to bring about a New World Economic order failed, one government after the other was replaced by military rule. At the end of the seventies, all South America with the exception of Venezuela and violence-stricken Colombia, was ruled by the military. To be sure, the military in Brazil seized power with an economic program that differed widely from that of the Chilean or Peruvian military. But all were as undemocratic as one would expect a military regime to be. While the Brazilian and Peruvian models of development collapsed, the Chilean military functioned as an avant-garde for the transition from importsubstitution to export-led growth on the basis of structural adjustment. That is to say it introduced to Latin America, with the help of the `Chicago boys' the neo-liberal scheme of development through privatization, deregulation and politically unrestricted integration into the world market.

The military regimes, for reasons which differed from country to country but which also displayed a general pattern, began to step down in the early eighties and made room for a hitherto unprecedented democratization in Latin America. Among the general factors leading to this development, two seem to be of special importance. (1) The military had `done their job' by virtually eliminating the guerilla as a threat to the state but they had at the same time discredited themselves through their brutality which was exposed time and again by human rights groups and official international organs (UN and inter-American Human Rights Commissions) and which contradicted the self-image of the Latin American societies as being part of Western civilization. (2) With the exception of Chile, the economic competence of the military seemed limited. The debt crisis was in part attributed to the performance of the military in the seventies. The military had developed vested interests in the state-led economies which turned into obstacles for structural adjustment. Thus they outlived themselves with a view to the economic situation as it had developed under their rule.

The transformation that came about with the retreat of the military was without precedent in Latin America (Diamond 1989). Today almost all countries of Latin America not only proclaim their adherence to the ideals of democracy but also have undergone serious reforms of their political systems in order to actually achieve democratization. This clearly goes beyond the traditional swings of the pendulum between more progressive and more repressive phases in Latin American history. However, democratization faces serious problems and by no means can be regarded as completed even more than ten years after the de-militarization began (Nohlen/Thibaut 1992). The idea of an independent judiciary has still not taken root in most Latin American countries and public control of political power remains ineffective. After a brief upswing in the first phase of the transition to democracy, political parties face increasing difficulties in developing distinct political programs which would be suited to rally political support (Werz 1997). Due to privatization and deregulation the parties are not in a position any longer to `buy' support as they used to be able to do in the old clientelist system. While this is very positive from the viewpoint of democratization, it creates also a problem for the political process. The lack of a strong pluralist party system may lead to authoritarian manipulations of democratic institutions as practiced by President Fujimoro with his autogolpe in Peru. The much acclaimed civil society which did play a vital role in bringing about the demilitarization of Latin American politics is by no means in a position to take over the function of parties. In order to be successful, the organizations of the civil society have to specialize in certain issue areas. This is counterproductive to representing more general public concerns.

But Latin America is, of course, no monolith and their also is not only the alternative of democracy and dictatorship but there are many stages in between to consider. Along this line, Wiarda (1995, 232) suggests to take the possibility of an open corporatism as an intermediary stage between closed corporatism or dictatorship on the one hand, democracy on the other, into account. He also draws our attention to the fact that democratization proceeds uneven in Latin America. There are considerable differences in the degree to which countries have progressed with a view to the development of democratic institutions and of a democratic political culture. A pessimistic reading of this would lead to the conclusion that the most advanced countries today (Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Uruguay) have been the most advanced in the past, too, and yet, with the exception of Costa Rica, they suffered the worst repression of all Latin American countries under military rule. A more optimistic reading would have it that these countries by their example will enhance democratization in the other parts of Latin America. This could be encouraged by economic ties which have been rapidly expanding throughout Latin America since the late 80s. [15] In addition it could be argued that the recent crisis in East and Southeast Asia demonstrates the shortcomings of authoritarian paths of development so that the respective model will loose its attractiveness as an alternative to the democratic model.

State-Building, Militarization, Democratization and Peace in Latin America

Returning to and paraphrasing Charles Tilly, it can now be said that in Latin America war made states, but the states that finally evolved did not necessarily make war. Whereas in Europe the consolidation of the territorial state paved the way for international wars, in Latin America the incidence of international war went down as territorial rule was established, which took some sixty years to achieve. Whereas in Europe or in the larger Western World, war receded as democracy spread, in Latin America the number of international wars went down without a corresponding spread of democracy but in the face of continuous efforts at democratization. Thus, for the larger area in Latin America and the larger time span in its history, there has prevailed an undemocratic peace. The incidence of international war was not affected by the ups and downs of political modernization before the 1960s. Neither was it affected by the sweeping militarization and the ensuing democratization from the sixties onward. This observation contradicts the findings of Mansfield, Snyder and Wendt (1995) [16] that countries which undergo a regime change are more likely to go to war than countries with no regime-change whereby the war-proneness resulting from democratization is twice as high as the war-proneness resulting from a change to autocracy. According to this finding, the incidence of international war in Latin America should have gone up in the sixties and seventies and should have skyrocketed in the eighties. But in fact it continued to go down over the total time span. The only intra-Latin American military encounter of recent years, the border clash between Ecuador and Peru of 1995, took place between one country that had undergone a process of formal democratization (Ecuador) and one country in which the democratization process had been turned back (by Fujimoro's autogolpe). In spite of the peculiarity of the situation, this case could be subsumed under the thesis that democratization is especially war-prone. However, the thesis as such does not carry very far with a view to what happened in the entire region of Latin America over the time-span of four decades. Latin American experience, in particular, does not support the view, that war may result from the nationalist strategies used by the elites of democracy to mobilize support against the elites of the old system in the process of democratization or from any other feature of democratization.

Against this finding it could be argued that all the international wars that did take place in Latin America were wars among non-democracies or not yet mature democracies. But still the question would remain, why in the by far largest contiguous area of the region, South America, with the exception of the geographically limited border clashes between Peru and Ecuador, there has not been any international war since the Chaco War (1932-35),i.e. since sixty years (a period, by the way, that exceeds the OECD-peace). The democratic peace thesis as it has been read up to now claims that democracies are less likely to go to war with each other than authoritarian states. With a view to the Latin American experience, however, it would make more sense to state that democracies have other reasons not to fight each other than non-democracies. Which reasons may non-democracies have, beyond distance, deterrence and exhaustion, not to fight each other?

With regard to this question let us turn back to the factors which are relevant for explaining the democratic peace. As outlined above, there are four aspects of the problematique to be taken into account: economic interdependence, institutional factors, culture and in close connection with the latter the perception to form a pacific union. With a view to the first factor, it can flatly be stated that economic interdependence among the Latin American states, up to the 1990s, was certainly not among the major forces that shaped intra-Latin American relations. The Latin American economic history is characterized by a high degree of extra-regional dependence and a low degree of intra-regional exchange. This holds true not only for individual states but for the region as a whole. Post-World War II efforts to increase economic interdependence through the establishment of common markets and free trade zones have been rather disappointing. Only with the beginning of the 1990s did trade among Latin American states increase substantially. This was in part due to bilateral trade agreements, in part to new regional integration schemes of which Mercosur is by far the most important. While the bilateral agreements amounted more to a normalization of trade relations, the new regionalism in Latin America displays a greater dynamism. [17] So economic interdependence can become a politically important factor in the future but it has certainly not been in the past. The latter could be interpreted as a non-territorial distance between the Latin American states which helped to reduce the number of objects for possible disputes.

As to the second factor, institutional attributes of the political process, the democratic peace proposition claims that the checks and balances in a democracy slow down political decision-making while making it transparent at the same time. As outlined above, in most Latin American states there was at most only the appearance of democratic institutions and processes. But there was no functioning system of checks and balances. The judiciary was part of a corporate power play, so was the military. The role of the latter as guarantor of the constitutional order (along with wide-ranging provisions for a state of emergency which in all too many countries became the state of normalcy) certainly was a far cry from democratic checks and balances. So again, we run into difficulty in expelling international peace in Latin America.

However, there has been, among the Latin American states, a relatively high degree of basic similarity in the way in which political processes functioned despite of the regional variations in state-society relations. This similarity made it relatively easy for the political elites to understand what was going on in the sister republics. In this respect they could be relatively safe as to surprise moves among each other. It may sound too idealistic to talk of a high degree of mutual understanding and confidence, but if taken in a more technical non-normative sense (Rengger 1997), such understanding and confidence did exist. This is not to say that there were no power-rivalries in Latin America. The relations between Brazil, Argentina, and Chile were often overshadowed by such rivalries. In the 70s and 80s, under military rule, these rivalries escalated into an arms race between Argentina and Brazil. The latter was stopped as the military stepped down and made room for democratization. However, with a view to the long history of these rivalries without war, it would seem plausible to argue that the prevention of a further arms race between Argentina and Brazil was not only the product of democratization, rather, democratization could work this way because of the long tradition of non-war between the respective countries. In more general terms it could be stated that Latin American political leaders had a very clear understanding of the way in which the political process in the sister republics worked. This amounted to transparency and the latter in turn allowed for a certain mutual trust in situations of conflict (Rengger 1997). Under this perspective it would seem that, while peace may fare especially well under democratic checks and balances, it can also be helped by mutual familiarity of the governing elites with the political institutions and their functioning. [18]

If, however, familiarity with the institutions and practices of another state reveals the inherent aggressiveness of the latter, this would, of course, not result in cooperation but in defection (Axelrod 1984). This is were the importance of norms and culture becomes apparent. As indicated above, the democratic peace proposition may be read to imply that Democracies will rarely resort to violence in conflict with other democracies, because `in democracies, the relevant decisionmakers expect to be able to resolve conflict by compromise and nonviolence, respecting the rights and continued existence of opponents. Therefore democracies will follow norms of peaceful conflict resolution with other democracies, and will expect other democracies to do so with them'. In contrast `in non-democracies, decisionmakers use, and may expect their opponents to use, violence and the threat of violence to resolve conflict as part of their domestic political process' (Russett 1993, 35). With a view to Latin America, this would clearly imply that international war should be quite frequent since the domestic political process up to the 1980s and beyond has been marked by a high degree of violence in politics. The high and, up to the 1980s, steadily increasing number of internal wars testifies to this. Thus Latin American decisionmakers would have had growing reason to `defect' in their mutual relations, steering more likely a course of confrontation and of threatening or applying violence than of cooperation. But the contrary was the case. As the number of intra-national wars went up, the number of international wars among Latin American states continued to go down.

To explain this, we could refer to evidence presented by Russett et al. that `anocratic' states tend to fight less with each other than autocratic states (Russett 1993, 79). An explanation could be that they are so weak that they are completely absorbed by internal war. However, with a view to the history of the Latin American state in the context of social and economic development outlined above I would find it highly problematic to rest an explanation of the undemocratic peace in Latin America on the general classification of the Latin American states as anocratic. [19] Therefore I would like to offer another explanation. It refers to the fourth factor: the construction of a pacific union.

Wiarda writes in his 1990 study of the democratic revolution in Latin America that the democratic constitutions which the Latin American states gave themselves after independence `were never meant to be lived up to; rather, and in keeping with a long Latin American tradition that is still frequently followed, they were meant for the rest of the world to see and admire, meant to show that Latin America on the surface was just as “civilized” as other nationals. It was the intention of Latin America's founding fathers to provide the appearance of democracy and republicanism but not its substance' (Wiarda 1990, 17). This would imply that the democratic aspiration present in the history of Latin American constitutional law never was more than blunt ideology to deceive the world in order to be better able to keep and multiply existing privileges. There can be no doubt that this observation grasps a good part of what the persistent proclamation of lofty ideals was all about. Still I would like to propose a somewhat milder version of this critique.

If we understand culture not only as something we put on the wall to decorate our living room with but rather as an expression of the basic need of all human beings to make sense of their lives and thus of the world, we all have to live in (Geertz 1993), then lofty ideals which accompany the whole history of a people should be read as more than pure ideology (understood as a conscious effort to deceive the world). At least they should be read as an attempt at self-deception. But even so it becomes clear that the purely instrumental understanding of norms and ideas is not sufficient. I am referring her, of course, to the debate on whether ideas matter in politics or not. I agree with those who are of the opinion that they do. [20] Accordingly, I would like to offer the following reading of international peace in Latin America.

In Latin America there has been from the very beginning not only a community of ideologues trying to mislead the world about the true state of affairs in this part of the New World. Rather this community of ideologues was also a community of those who searched for meaning, who tried to state in an inspiring way what Latin American independence was all about. In this respect, what happened in Latin America is not so different from what happened in the North America. Few would denounce Thomas Jefferson as having been a mere ideologue because he wrote the Declaration of Independence and yet remained or rather became the second largest slave holder in Virginia. Jefferson expressed an aspiration around which a new public order was built. This new order remained contested until the Civil War. In Latin America, the libertadores took up the revolutionary aspirations of their times as they had come to bear in North America and in France. But due to the different constellation of power and interests in the former Spanish colonies these aspirations were not strong enough to inspire the creation of a new order that broke with the political culture of the colonial past. But even if the Latin Americans, while trying to deceive the outside world, only deceived themselves, they still created a system of reference for upholding a basic Latin American unity which was rooted in the common colonial experience and yet had the potential to transcend it.

Thus it was more than a pompous but empty gesture when the libertadores at the Congress of Panama in 1826, tried to combine emancipation from colonialism with the establishment of some union among the former colonies. We are used to see only the failure of the Panama-Project as of all other attempts, following randomly during the 19th century, to bring the Latin American states together. But I think we should also see that the repeated failures were the expression of a continuing aspiration to view Latin America as a (subregionally differentiated) group of states which was distinct from other states (Borja/Stevenson 1996). As Bolivar made clear from the beginning, the idea of a basic Latin American unity did not comprise the United States. To the contrary. Latin American unity was to ward of North American dominance. Ironically, the first organization under which all Latin American states finally did assemble was brought about by the United States. [21] The result was a regional system in which, however, the Latin American states finally did form some kind of community, if only vis a vis the United States (Brock 1974). This is not to say that the Latin American members of the Organization of American States always tried to counterbalance US ambitions. Quite frequently, individual states or rather governments tried to instrumentalize US power by voting with the US. Nevertheless, the Interamerican system did serve as a forum for Latin American identity formation including the construction of a Latin American culture with the help of art exhibitions at the Pan American Union in Washington, DC.

Though the Latin American community of states within the Interamerican System was and is a far cry from the kind of pacific union that Kant had in mind, the idea of a basic Latin American unity and the way this idea was tied into the (US-sponsored) Western Hemisphere Idea (Whitaker 1954), according to my reading, contributed to the prevention of the externalization of conflict within the Latin American states. It did so by fostering the formation of a habitual expectation that Latin American states would not go to war with one another and that there would be a basic solidarity in dealing with non-Latin American states as it came to bear, to the surprise of many, when Argentina went to war with Great Britain over the Falklands/Malvinas. I do in no way suggest, to take Latin American rhetoric or even the many efforts to integrate the region economically (and to that extent politically) at face value. But I do think that they should neither be met with contempt when it comes to explain the undemocratic peace in Latin America.

Conclusions

Latin American experience with war and peace at the international level displays a striking feature. There is a remarkable continuity in the decline of the number of international wars which stands in sharp contrast to the discontinuities in the development of state-society relations. From the 1880s to the 1960s the search for public order produced solutions which oscillated over time and space between more authoritarian and more democratic, or closed and open corporatist models. In the early 1960s a sweeping repressive militarization of all of Latin America took place which was superseded, in the early 1980s, by an equally sweeping democratization. My attempt to account for the lack of correlation between the development of state-society relations on the one hand, the occurrence of international war on the other, suggests the following modifications of the democratic peace proposition.

(1) While economic interdependence is generally regarded as fostering cooperation, international peace in Latin America developed before economic interdependence did. The lack of interdependence can be interpreted as a non-territorial distance between the Latin American states which helped to reduce the number of objects of possible disputes. Thus a low degree of interdependence, by creating non-territorial distance, can foster peace just as well a high degree of interdependence by creating closeness. From this it may be concluded that there is no linear increase of the peace-proneness of interdependence but rather that a medium level of interdependence is most likely to lead to conflict because their is enough at stake to fight over but not enough to render such a fight counterproductive from the very beginning.

(2) With a view to the institutional prerequisites of peace, Latin American experience suggests that transparency of political processes in the sense that all sides understand what is going on in the other states and how the respective political systems work allows for a certain trust or confidence in situations of conflict. Under this perspective it would seem that, while peace may fare especially well under democratic checks and balances as the latter can be expected to slow down political decisionmaking, peace can also be helped by mutual familiarity with the political institutions and their functioning as such because this would preclude inadequate interpretations of how decisions will be reached within the opposing government (cf. Gleditsch/Hegre 1997).

(3) The Latin American experience calls for an inclusion of `the subjective factor' into the analysis of the war-peace problematique on the international level. Accordingly, the assumptions of the democratic peace proposition pertaining to norms and culture would have to be modified in the sense, that a political culture which is conducive to international peace can also develop in the form of imagined communities at the international level. The latter does not necessarily have to be rooted in democratic practice, it can also be based on democratic aspirations and on the construction of self-images that are in accord with international norms.

(4) The transition from an authoritarian to a democratic order may lead to political fragmentation and thus encourage integrative politics based on taking a strong stand in international conflicts. Thus the process of democratization may go along with increased international confrontation. Fortunately, however, this is not necessarily so. In Latin America, democratization up to now has not increased the propensity for international war. Rather, by strengthening those aspects of the international milieu, which reward the ending of violence in state-society relations, democratization as a general movement across the region has helped to end internal wars in Central America. To put it in more general terms, the international political implications of democratization are dependent as much on the domestic power play unleashed by democratization as on the international milieu in which democratization takes place.

What are the policy implications of these considerations? If there can be other forms of peace than democratic ones, the democratic peace has to be viewed not only as an analytical but also as a normative concept. Thus a policy guided by the ideas of the democratic peace proposition would have to be a policy that consciously pursues both, pacification and democratization. Transcending a country by country approach this would include the task of creating an international milieu which can be perceived by states in transition as being in conformity with the UN Charter. The perception that such a milieu exists would support the internalization of international legal norms which is indispensable for a stable peace among states as the internalization of rules is for upholding peace within societies. In this respect, the OECD countries proper are called upon to stick to the rules of multilateral cooperation and the pacific settlement of disputes.

The latter includes a new emphasis on input-oriented vis a vis output-oriented legitimization. With a view to past interventionist practice in Central America, the foreign policy decisionmakers in the US tend to think exclusively in terms of output legitimization. Since with the signing of the peace accord in Guatemala intra-state war has now come to an end in all of Central America, the general understanding seems to be that US policy, whatever the means, was effective in supporting peace and democratization. [22] However, as things stand now, the wars in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala have not been ended but transformed into non-war (or Hobbesian) forms of violence. So there is a long way to go in order to establish peace and the question has to be raised what external intervention has contributed not only to bringing about peace but also to protract violence.

Democracy is not only about ends but also about means. Thus, input legitimization cannot be replaced by output legitimization. When this lesson tends to be forgotten, interest in public affairs dwindles. This is what is happening today in all the mature democracies. As the notion of democratization gains in acceptance around the world, its substance threatens to be hollowed out under the pressure of stiffening world market competition which favors ends over means. This assumption points to the necessity to join the discourse on the democratic peace with the discourses on the impact of globalization on state-society relations and on international security. These discourses tend to isolate themselves from one another for the sake of parsimony but at the risk of oversimplification.

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Footnotes

[1] Jackson 1990; Gurr 1993 For a review of recent literature on internal wars cf. Steven R. David. `Internal War'. World Politics 49:4, July 1997, 552-576.

[2] Russett 1993, 10. Cf. Babst 1972; Wallensteen 1973; Rummel 1975 sq; Doyle 1983 and 1996; Gledtisch 1992; Sorensen 1992; Bremer 1993; Ray 1995; Risse-Kappen 1996; Gleditsch/Hegre 1996. A review of the literture may be found in Brown/Lynn-Jones/Miller 1997, 37-379.

[3] In the reader by Brown/Lynn-Jones and Miller (1996) Michael W. Doyle, Bruce Russett and John M. Owen argue the pro, and Christopher Layne, David E. Spiro as well as Henry S. Farber and Joanne Gowa stand for the contra while Ido Oren makes his point on the `subjectivity' of the democratic peace and Edward D.Mansfield and Jack Snyder present their data an the ware-proneness of states in the process of democratization. Cf. Also Oren (1995) and Mansfield/Snyder/Wendt (1995).

[4] Katzenstein 1996; Wendt 1992; 1994; Risse-Kappen 1994b; Goldstein 1993; Goldstein/Keohane 1993; Sikkink 1991.

[5] Friedrich Gentz. Ueber den ewigen Frieden (1800) . Reprinted in Kurt von Raumer. Ewiger Friede. Friedensrufe und Friedensplaene seit der Renaissance. Freiburg/Muenchen 1953, 461-491; Richard Cobden. The Political Writings of Richard Cobden. London: T Fischer Unwin. 1903; Norman Angel. The Great Illusion.London: Heinamann 1935 (first publ. 1910); David Mitrany. The Progress of International Government. New Haven: Yale University Press 1933; David Mitrany. A Working Peace System. Chicago: Quadrangle 1966; Rosecrance 1986; Copeland 1996; Oneal/Russett 1997.

[6] Despite of the glorificatin of the Cuban freedom figherts before the war, the latter were not regarded as being able to govern themselves properly after the war. The Platt Amendment, i.a. national US legislation, amounted to a denial of self-determination to the Cuban people.

[7] Wendt 1994 speakes in this context of the formation of a transborder structure which he calles an `international state'. Kant could be read of course as thinking in these terms. In my understanding he addressed more importance to the cosmopolitan beliefs than to cosmopolitican institutions. Be that as it may, in the context of the present paper I would like to make the point that the failure of intra-Latin American institution-building along the lines envisioned by Bolivar should not be read as an absence of a politically effective imagened community.

[8] Kurtenbach 1991, 175ff. The definition of war used by the Hamburg group goes back to Istvan Kende and more or less corresponds with that used by Evan Luard (1986: 6). It encompasses the following characteristics: War is a militarized conflict between two or more units of which at least one must function officially in the name of a government. On both sides their must be a minimum of centralized decisionmaking, strategic behavior and organizational continuity (Kurtenbach 1991:1). According to Small/Singer (1982) there were only ten international wars in the region from 1820 to 1980.

[9] The Granchaco War (1932-35) between Paraguay and Bolivia, i.e. in the same area and sixty years later was by far the bloddiest international war in the 20th century.

[10] "With the exception of Brazil, all the new states adopted the republican form of government (...) and paid their respect to the formulas of parliamentary and representative government. Their constitutions provided for presidents, congresses, and courts; often they contained elaborate safeguards of individual rights” (Keen/Wassermann 1988, 176).

[11] Marcello Carmagnani. Estado y Sociedad en América Latina, l850-1930. Barcelon: Edición Crítica 1984; Christopher Clapham, ed. Private Patronage and Public Power. Political Clientelism in the Modern State. London: Frences Pinter 1982; Enzo Faletto. The Specificity of the Latin American State. CEPAL Review 38, 1988, 69-87; Peter Flynn. `Class, Clientelism, and Coercion: Some Mechanisms of Internal Dependency and Control'. The Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics. 12:2, July 1974, 133-156; Hugo Frühling , Carlos Portales, Augusto Varas. Estado y Fuerzas Armadas. Santiago: FLACSO 1982; Rolf Hanisch and Rainer Tetzlaff, eds. Historische Konstitutionsbedingungen des Staates in Entwicklungsländern. Frankfurt/New York: Campus 1980; ; Marcos Kaplan. Estado y sociedad en América Latina. Mexico: Ed. Oasis 1984; Brian Loveman, Thomas M. Davies Jr., eds. The Politics of Antipolitics.the Military in Latin America. Lincoln/London: University of Nebraska Press 1978; S.N. Eisenstadt and René Lemarchand, ed. Political Clientelism, Patronage and Development. Berverly Hills/London: Sage 1981; James M. Malloy, ed. Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press 1977; H.C.F. Mansilla. `Neopatrimoniale Aspekte von Staat und Gesellschaft in Latinamerika. Machtelite und Bürokratismus in einer politischen Kultur des Autoritarismus'. Politische Viertelsjahresschrift 1, 1990, 33-53; Joel S. Migdal. Strong Societies and Weak States. State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press 1988; Claudio Veliz. The Centralist Tradition of Latin America. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press 1980.

[12] Francisco Bilbao, La America en Peligro, Santiago de Chile 1941 (1862), cited in Keen 1974, 9.

[13] There exists an extensive literature dealing with Latin American political development in the context of socio-economic history. The present paper draws heavily on Keen/Wassermann 1988 and Wiarda 1995, ch. 8 as well as Gustavo Beyhaut. Süd- und Mittelamerika II. Von der Unabhängigkeit bis zur Krise der Gegenwart. Frankfurt: Fischer 1965; Woodrow Borah. `Colonial Institutions and Contemporary Latin America: Political and Economic Life'. Hispanic American Historical Review 43:3, 1963, 371-379; David Bushnell and Neill Macaulay. The Emergence of Latin America in the Nineteenth Century. New York/Oxford:Oxford University Press 1988; William P. Glade. The Latin American Economies. A Study of their Institutional Evolution. New York: American Book 1969. Larry Diamond, ed. Democracy in Developing Countries, Vol. 4: Latin America. Boulder: LynneRienner 1989.

[14] Due to its role as a safe heaven for the Protuguese crown during the Napoleonic wars, Brazil had remained under semi-colonial rule.

[15] Bouzas/Ros 1994; Frohmann 1996; CEPAL 1994; Fernandez 1996; Borja/Gonzales/Stevenson1996; Roberto Proano Rivas. Nueva realidád de la integracion latinoamerican. Quito: Etitorial Ecuador 1993.

[16] Cf. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder. `Democratization and the Danger of War'. In Brown/Lynn-Jones/Miller 1996, 301-334.

[17] Frohmann 1996; CEPAL 1994; Hufbauer/Schott 1994; Thomas Andrew O'Keefe. Latin American Tade Agreements. Irvington on Hudson, NY: Transnational Publishers 1997; Roberto Proano Rivas. Nueva realidad de la integacion latinoamerican, Quito: Editorial Ecuador 1993.

[18] At a seminar co-organized by the author in Costa Rica in February 1987, at which political and military representatives of all the Central Amercan states took part for the first time since the early eighties, the latter displayed a remarkable familiarity with each other. Participants understood each other 'right off the bat' regardless of which country and which political grouping or institution they came form. This is a well established pattern dispite of the fact that Latin Americans are eager to underline the distinctnes of each country.

[19] Wiarda 1995, ch. 8; Menno Vellinga, ed. The Changing Role of the State in Latin America. Utrecht: University of Utrecht 1995; Claudio Veliz. The Centralist Tradition in Latin America. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1980; Manfred Mols und Josef Tehsing, eds. DerStaat in Lateinamerika. Mainz:Hase und Koehler 1995.

[20] Moravcsik 1997; Katzenstein 1996, Risse-Kappen 1994b, Goldstein 1993; Goldstein/Keohane 1993; Sikkink 1991.

[21] Gordon Connell Schmith. The Interamerican Sysem. London/New York: Oxfort UP 1966; Ann Van Wynen Thomas and A.J. Thomas, Jr. The Organization of American States. Dallas: Southern Methodistist UP 1963; Brock 1974.

[22] In a hearing on the Status of the Hemisphere in 1996, Senator J. Helms stated: `Thanks in large part to the determination of Presidents Reagan and Bush, the American diplomats and soldiers whoh served this country with distinction throughtout the hemisphere, and the thousands of freedom fighers who sacrificed so much to bring the rule of law to their own countries, the picture today-while far from perfect-is much brighter. Thugs like Fidel Castro are now the exception, not the rule-and his days are numbered. He knows and we know it. Communism in Cuba will be extinguished.” Hearing before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs of the Committee on Foreing Relations. United States Senate. One Hundred Fourth Congress, Second Session, June 14, 1996. Washington: GPO 1996, 2. For a discussion of the problems involved here cf. Lopez/Stohl 1989 and Lopez/Christiansen 1995.